

THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN TANZANIA

**REPORT OF THE TANZANIA ELECTION MONITORING
COUNCIL**

TEMCO

VOLUME 1

Abbreviations

ARO	Assistant Registration Officers
CBO	Community Based organizations
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CHAUSTA	Chama cha Ustawi Tanzania
CO	Camera Operator
CUF	Civic United Front
FBO	Faith Based Organizations
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
PVR	Permanent Voters' Register
RO	Registration Officer
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TEMCO	Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
NCCR-MAGEUZI	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NEC	National Electoral Committee
UDP	United Democratic Party
VE	Voter Education
WEC	Ward Education Coordinators
WEO	Ward Executive Officers
ZEC	Zanzibar Democratic Committee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE	ii
THE POLITICS OF THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER.....	ii
Introduction	ii
2. Voter Registration and Politics	ii
3.0 THE POLITICS OF THE PVR	v
3.1 INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF THE REGISTRATION PROCESS	vi
3.1.1 Effects of Election Monitoring Reports	viii
3.1.2 The Legal Basis of the PVR	ix
3.2 CONTROLLING BODY: NEUTRAL OR PARTISAN?	x
3.3 THE REGISTRATION PROCESS	xiii
3.3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATION OF PVR	xiv
4. CONCLUSION	xvii
CHAPTER TWO.....	xviii
MANAGEMENT OF THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER (PVR)	
.....	xviii
Introduction	xviii
2. Management/ Network System for Registration of Voters	xix
Registration Centres	xxi
3. Recruitment and Training of the Registration Officials	xxiv
4. Distribution of Registration Materials	xxv
5. The Registration Process	xxx
6. Security and Monitoring	xxxii
Conclusion	xxxiv
CHAPTER THREE.....	xxxvii
THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER: COMPLAINTS, OBJECTIONS, AND THEIR RESOLUTIONS	xxxvii
.....	xxxvii
Introduction	xxxvii
Formal Mechanism for Handling Complaints	xxxvii
Objections and Mechanism for Handling them	xxxviii
Objections, Complaints and their Resolution during Registration	xl
Objections, Complaints from the Provisional Voters' Register	xlvi
Conclusion	xlvii
CHAPTER FOUR	xlviii
VOTER EDUCATION AND RESPONSE	xlviii
1.0 Contextual Framework	xlviii
2.0 Facilitators of Voter Education	l
2.1 The National Electoral Commission	l
2.2 Government Officials	lii
Political Parties	liv
Civil Society Organizations	lvi
2.5 The Media	lviii
2.6 Consequences of Inadequate VE Interventions	lix
3.0 People's Awareness	lx
4.0 Voters Response	lxi
4.1 Voters Response by Gender	lxii
Lessons of Experience and Conclusion	lxv
APPENDICES.....	94

CHAPTER ONE

THE POLITICS OF THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER

Introduction

For the past one year, Tanzania's political landscape has been dominated by the creation of the Permanent Voters' Register. This process has involved the mobilisation, identification, and listing of all Tanzanians who are eligible to vote. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) has had to identify all eligible voters and create a list of their names and other information relevant to the voting process for example their sex, age, place of birth and domicile. In subsequent presentations, colleagues will deal with the managerial and technical issues involved in the creation of the PVR. Issues of voter education and responses, complaints and their resolution, will also be addressed. This presentation deals with the politics of the creation of the PVR. The following section discusses voter registration and politics. Section three describes and analyses the politics of the PVR in Tanzania. Section four concludes.

2. Voter Registration and Politics

Elections are a critical component of any political system that presents itself as based on the consent of the governed. Inevitably voter registration is one of the most critical stages in the electoral process. While it is true that voting is not a privilege given to individuals by governments, but is an inalienable right, it is equally true that the right is not absolute. Thus while registering confers on the citizens, the right to participate in decisions concerning their leadership, it denies such rights to others. As someone has very well put it, the question in many polities is not "do people have the right to vote"? but "which people have the right to vote in a particular election"?

How the above question is answered depends on the nature of the systems of production, reproduction and domination at a particular point in space and time. In the Greek State of Athens (c.600 – 480), a democracy which has been characterised as "quite out of the ordinary", and that "nothing like it had existed before and little like it has ever existed since"¹, only one third of the population exercised the right to vote as citizens. Only those in class one to three (peutekosiomedimnoi, hippeis and zeugitar) had the right to vote. The **Thetes** or labourers were usually slaves and though consisting of about two thirds of the population did not have the right to participate in the affairs of the polis, including voting². Throughout history, people have been

¹ Finer, S. E. (1999) *The History of Government*. Vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press: 341

² Ibid

excluded from the voters' register on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, ownership of property, place of domicile etc. To be in or out of the voters' register is an issue that has pitted rules against subjects, citizens against fellow citizens, and even neighbour against neighbour.

A voters' register, like the larger elections is a political instrument whose essence and nature, role, and characteristics depends on the interests which it is supposed to serve, the role that it is supposed to play, objectives that it is supposed to achieve, within the context of the larger electoral process and political system. Voters' registers are always driven by a certain clear political logic, which permeates the entire political system. They are always part of a puzzle, a link in a chain. They are always part of a package of other measures; processes and acts aimed at serving that over-arching political logic. This political logic could be continued domination, exclusion of certain social groups or more positively, inclusion of all citizens in the polity.

Examples abound of gender discrimination in voting. In twenty-one European countries, the United States and Canada, women secured the right to vote and to be elected after the 1st World War. In no fewer than fourteen countries women only obtained voting rights after the Second World War. And it was only recently that women in Cyprus, Liechstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland won the right to vote. In other regions, only eleven countries had their women on the voters' role before 1940. These include Latin America and five Asian countries, all of which had been independent for some time: Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, the Maldives, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Uruguay. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab countries and in the Pacific where a large number of countries were colonised, only women of European descent were given the right to vote and to be elected until after the second World War³. The only exception was Lebanon, then administered by France, where women were given the right to vote and be elected in 1928.

In pre-independence Tanganyika elections from 1958 – 1960, the colonial power sought to deny the obvious political destiny of a Tanganyika ruled by Africans. It pursued the so-called policy of **Multiracialism** which sought to give each racial group equal representation in the unofficial side of the legislature. They pursued the parity principle. Consequently each constituency was to elect one African, one Asian and one European. A common vote's rule was adopted. To be registered, one had to be 21 years old or above, have a standard VIII education and above; be employed in certain posts or have an annual income of at least one hundred and fifty British pounds (£150). The objective was to drastically reduce the numbers of eligible African voters, in order to give

Europeans and Asians more say. Only six hundred thousand Africans were registered out of an estimated population of 8.7 million. The figures improved to nine hundred thousand as independence approached in 1960. Still this was only 10.1 per cent of the population⁴. The demand for universal suffrage was one of the key issues in the anti-colonial struggle for independence. In his address to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in 1955, Nyerere said: “We have accepted the principle of parity of representation on our Legislation Council, but we have accepted it on the understanding that it is a transitional stage towards a more democratic form of representation. We want an assurance that future forms of representation will be in the direction of giving Africans a majority on all representative bodies”⁵.

With independence however, the political logic and politics changed dramatically. Exclusion was now replaced by inclusion. The political system sought to mobilise and maximise participation by all. Though the voting age was still 21, efforts were made to mobilise all the eligible citizens to register. According to one observer, “more determined efforts were made to “chase up people to register”. A vigorous campaign led by the local TANU organization was mounted. It included village and Assistant Division Executive Officers, tax clerks, and the lower levels of local government personnel. Indeed after a problem of ineligibility emerged in border areas for non-citizens, on June 25th 1965, a ruling was issued allowing people from bordering countries to be automatically eligible on a residential qualification of five or more years⁶.

Perceptions and or expectations of whether registration will be an occasion for inclusion or exclusion determines individual and group reactions to it. Perceptions of exclusionary tendencies will trigger political struggles and resistance.

The integrity of the election process partly hinges on the completeness and reliability of the voters' register. For a voters' register to inspire confidence and be fully acceptable, it needs to be fair, and inclusive of all those eligible to vote. It also needs to be free of contamination through additions of the under-age and the dead, double registration etc. The process of voter creation itself needs to be smooth, efficient and transparent without intentional wrinkles (or mizengwe) which facilitate contamination. As a rule, voters' registers which are too involving, expensive, and repetitive are more prone to abuse than others. Voters' registers that are accessible to many people are more prone to contamination and abuse than others.

³ Kamba, K. (1977) *Women in Parliamentary Politics in Tanzania*. University of Dar es Salaam: MA Thesis

⁴ Listowel, J. (1965) *The Making of Tanganyika* London: Chatto and Windus.

⁵ Nyerere, J. (1967) *Uhuru na Umoja* Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press: 37

The colonial voters register consisted of electoral lists in which those who met the conditions were listed. Copies of full lists were printed for each polling district. Large quantities of stencils, duplicating paper, duplicating ink; typewriters, duplicating machines as well as hundreds of typists were required to produce lists, which were redundant, as soon as the election was over. The process was involving, expensive and wasteful since it had to be repeated every five years. Electoral lists were replaced by a voters' register with voting cards and indelible ink. This system continued to be used until very recently. Its shortcomings led to moves to create the PVR as will be shown shortly.

Issues might also be raised regarding management and control of the entire exercise, whether the body in charge is neutral or not. The neutrality or otherwise of the management body became an issue the more the polarization of the social and political forces. The timing of the exercise might also be an issue. Some might feel that the timing advantages some and disadvantages others. In previous elections, there were slow turnouts for registration because the exercise was carried out before candidates were known. As far back as the 1965 elections, Belle Harris notes that "in Mwibara, people were heard to observe that they wanted to know the candidates before they registered"⁷. Writing on registration for the 1985 elections, Bavu notes that "information that reached the Party and the government was that citizens, both CCM members and others, would not turn out to register to vote before knowing who the presidential candidate(s) would be. This "threat" shocked the Party and forced it to make a special appeal..." Registration procedures may also be contentious. Some might feel that they make it difficult for some groups to register.

Secondly and relatedly, is the question of the nature of the voters' register itself and how it is perceived. The nature of the Register itself can be contentious.

3.0 THE POLITICS OF THE PVR

This section is about politics in the preparation of the PVR in Mainland Tanzania. We will focus on three main areas in our discussion. These are the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the process; the electoral supervising body, and the registration process itself, including its timing and procedures. To what extent were they contentious, partisan and politicised. Who were the perceived winners and losers?

⁶ The United Republic of Tanzania Report of the Third General Election of Members of the National Assembly and the Second Presidential Election in Tanzania, printed in 1966

⁷ Harris, B. (1967) "The Electoral System" in Lionell Cliffe (Ed) One Party Democracy. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.

3.1 INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

To different stakeholders in an election the credibility and authenticity of a particular voters' register goes hand in hand with accommodation of their specific interests, which obviously include among others things, allowing their respective supporters uninterrupted opportunity to exercise their right to register.

As alluded to in the foregoing section, the post-independence political system sought the participation of all people in the electoral process. The voters' registration process was conducted in such a way as to include most of the eligible voting population rather than to exclude them as was the case in colonial times. In this regard, the voting age was lowered to 18 years from 21 in order to accord a voting opportunity to more young men and women.

Before the recent introduction of the PVR, Tanzania had been using the Election-specific Voters' registration for all elections including the 2004 civic polls. In this system the electoral commission had to register people anew in every election. In an attempt to attract more voters, and at the same time ameliorate some of the problems associated with the electoral lists registration system successive electoral commissions proposed several changes from time to time. For example, in the 1965 elections the commission recommended the introduction of voting cards and indelible ink to replace electoral lists, which had been in previous elections as already noted.⁸

The electoral roll system was not only a time and money consuming exercise, but also was liable to fall out of date very quickly. This is because voters were continually changing their places of residence and addresses, mainly as a result of employment changes, but also due to Government Village Settlement Schemes, which were carried out at the time. Moreover, there were new entrants of eligible voters each year: those who reached the qualifying age of voting, and others who acquired citizenship.⁹

An interesting set up during the one party era is that the Electoral Commission had to work closely with Party leaders. It informed the TANU, later CCM leaders in the regions and districts of every step in the registration process. Party leaders were asked to ensure, through party ten-cells that

⁸ The United Republic of Tanzania Report of the Third General Election of Members of the National Assembly and the Second Presidential Election in Tanzania, printed in 1966.

⁹ Ibid.p.4

most if not all-eligible voters went to register themselves as voters. Registration as such was not contentious. However, because like the broader political system, it was driven by the logic of inclusion the use of voting cards on Election Day was at times problematic. Several losing candidates on numerous occasions complained of double voting on behalf of their opponents. Complaints increased with the introduction of multipartism.

Voters' registration, therefore, had not been a contentious issue, at least in the Mainland, because the post-independence registration system had been devised to include more people in the electoral process, and not otherwise. The number of registered voters kept increasing with each general election from 1.8 million in 1962, to through 3.1 million in 1965, to 8.8 million in 1995, which increased to 10.8 in 2000¹⁰.

With the introduction of multipartism, a number of problems started to emerge during voters' registration. Some of the problems were due to shortcomings in performance, whilst others were caused by "undue political zeal which resulted in flouting the law, for example, double registration of voters".¹¹ In the 1995 Elections, NEC invited political parties to station their agents at registration centres so as to increase the transparency of the whole process.¹²

However, some of these agents interfered with the functions of the Registration Assistants. Some of these agents were instructed by their political parties to conduct parallel registration, which is contrary to the law.¹³ However political parties were not accorded the opportunity to monitor the registration exercise in the 1999 Hamlet and Neighbourhood elections, which are up to this moment a responsibility of the President office, Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government.

Registration of voters in the 1999 Hamlet and Neighbourhood elections were also conducted without the presence of registration centres. Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Governments for these elections specified that registration clerks would go from house to house to register all potential voters. According to these guidelines, those omitted from the register were allowed to petition for their names to be included. This arrangement is said to have created confusion and many complaints, both from political parties and from the voters

¹⁰ Various election study reports

¹¹ The Report of the NEC on the 1995 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.

¹² Ibid. p 32

¹³ Ibid.

themselves¹⁴. There were claims that registration clerks skipped houses of potential supporters of opposition parties.

Both the ruling party and opposition parties participated in the 1995 and 2000 elections as well as the numerous by-elections in which election-specific voters' registers were prepared. It was within the opposition parties' interest to press for the replacement of the election-by-election registration approach with the PVR as they felt the former system was prone to manipulation by the ruling party. The CCM Government on its part reacted positively on the idea of the PVR as it enjoyed comfortable support from voters in both elections. However, it was concerned with the costs of preparing and establishing a PVR. Preparing and establishing a national PVR required a separate budget of more than 30 billion shillings.¹⁵ The costs associated with registration in the 1995 and 2000 general elections was 10.027 billion shillings out of 38.5 billion shillings (26 per cent), and 10.27 billion shillings out of 39.89 billion shillings (25.7 per cent) respectively.¹⁶

The opposition parties' claim for a PVR was reinforced by recommendations of both local and international election observers. The following sub-section highlights those recommendations.

3.1.1 Effects of Election Monitoring Reports

Both local and international election observation teams monitored the 2000 General Election to ascertain whether election rules were scrupulously observed and enforced by all parties and whether eligible voters were allowed to exercise their voting rights.

In its report, TEMCO concluded that the registration process in Mainland Tanzania went more smoothly than that of 1995 despite observing some shortcomings. These problems/shortcomings were grouped into eight broad categories, namely:

- Problems related to shortages of registration materials;
- Misconceptions of prospective eligible voters;
- Problems related to the activities of registration Clerks;
- Shortcomings concerning registration centres;
- Problems related to party agents;
- Violations of Election laws; and
- Management or NEC administrative problems.¹⁷

¹⁴ Chaligha, A.E. (2002), "The 1999 Neighborhood, Hamlet, and Village Council Elections in Tanzania", REDET MONOGRAPH SERIES NO. 2, p 17-18.

¹⁵ President Mkapa's monthly speech, January 2004

¹⁶ NEC: Uanzishaji wa Daftari la Kudumu la Wapiga Kura

¹⁷ TEMCO Report, the 2000 General Election in Tanzania p.34

Consequently, TEMCO offered several recommendations in order to solve some of the identified problems in future elections. One of the recommendations was for the electoral authorities to hasten posting voter registration lists so that objections are dealt with in a timely fashion, and thus allow those objected to an opportunity to appeal.¹⁸

The SADC observation group also echoed more or less the same sentiments regarding the 2000 general elections. The following are some of the recommendations included in the SADC report:

- The electoral authorities should provide political parties, candidates, voters and any other interested persons with the opportunity to inspect the voters' register and make appropriate objections to correct the register before the election day;
- Provisions should be made to enable aggrieved parties to challenge the decisions of the electoral commission regarding registration, delimitation of electoral boundaries, the election results or any other relevant matters;
- The government should introduce a reliable national identification system, as this would improve the conduct of registration and polling.¹⁹

Most of these concerns and recommendations have been accommodated in the recently passed amendments to the Elections Act No. 1 of 1985, which among others, focused on improving procedures for registering voters.

3.1.2 The Legal Basis of the PVR

Following widespread shortcomings, which were observed in the registration of voters in the 1995 General Election, and as a follow up to Muafaka I of 1999, amendments were made to the 1977 United Republic of Tanzania Constitution and 1985 Electoral Laws to pave way for the establishment of a national PVR. In January 2000, Article 5(3) of the URT 1977 Constitution, and section 12 of the Elections Act No. 1 of 1985 were amended because of the aforementioned reason.

However, due to shortage of time and financial and material limitations, a PVR could not be prepared in time to be used for the 2000 General election. Four years later, viz. 2004, some sections of the Elections Act No. 1 of 1985 and the Local Government Elections Act No.4 of 1979 concerning registration of voters, were further reviewed in order to allow NEC to effectively prepare and administer a PVR.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.47-49

¹⁹ The SADC 2000 Tanzania Presidential and National Assembly Election Observation Report Accessed from <http://www.sadcpf.org/>

According to amendments, which were passed in the Parliament on 9 June 2004,²⁰ Section 11 A (1) of the Elections Act No. 1 of 1985, and Section 15A (1) of the Local Government Elections Act No. 4 of 1979, now empower NEC to establish a Provisional Voters' Register for the purpose of preparing a Permanent National Voters' register.

Section 11 A- (2) of the 1985 Electoral law specifically list down the uses of the Provisional Voters' Register to be for:

- “(a) Displaying for inspection by the public;
- (b) amendments regarding change of residence or any other particulars of the voter;
- (c) making objection against registration of any voter;
- (d) inclusion or deletion of the name of the voter in the register; and
- (e) Effecting any other correction or amendments as may be required under this Act”.²¹

3.2 CONTROLLING BODY: NEUTRAL OR PARTISAN?

The integrity of a well-completed voters' register also hinges on the role played by the body entrusted with the responsibility of administering the whole electoral process. Is the electoral body perceived to be neutral or partisan in carrying out its duties? Do the players in the electoral game have faith in the electoral supervising body, and thus trust it to oversee the preparation and establishment of a PVR? These are some of the questions being addressed in this section.

Since its inception the neutrality of the national electoral body in Tanzania has been one of the contentious issues²². A year after the re-introduction of multiparty elections members of political parties took NEC to court challenging its members for being partisan. The country's High Court issued a ruling, which is yet to be challenged in court, to the effect that partisanship lies with a person and not with the appointing authority²³. It should be noted that currently all members of NEC are presidential appointees.

In the 1995 elections NEC operated with little trust from participating opposition political parties. Leaders of opposition parties organised numerous meetings in which they persistently called for the total disbandment of the NEC and its re-constitution through a consultative process²⁴. Moreover,

²⁰ Act No. 13 of 2004 s.10

²¹ The Elections Act No. 1 of 1985 as amended up to 30th April 2005.

²² See Kiravu, R.R. (2005) "Improving Elections in Tanzania", paper presented to a Commonwealth Chief Election Officers Conference on Improving the Quality of Election Management, the Ashok Hotel, New Delhi, India, 24-26 February.

²³ Civil case No. 168 of 1993, Mabere Nyaicho Marando & Edwin Mtei versus the Hon. Attorney General & NEC.

²⁴ TEMCO 1995 Report, p. 138

the problem of party agents' payments, and others leading to the suspension of voting in the seven constituencies of Dar es Salaam did little to spare the integrity of the NEC.

In the 2000 elections' cooperation between NEC and the political parties improved to the extent that a code of conduct was signed by a majority of political parties, the Government and NEC²⁵. Attempts at agreeing on a similar code of conduct had tailed in 1995. NEC's performance also improved tremendously. TEMCO said in 2000 that "TEMCO wishes to state that, in comparison with 1995, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) showed improved skills in managing the 2000 general elections on the mainland"²⁶.

However, in February 2004, the opposition alliance constituting of nine political parties²⁷ under the leadership of Mr. John Cheyo, the UDP chairman, threatened to lodge a case against NEC, seeking to bar the commission from presiding over elections and also prevent it from preparing the PVR. The alliance questioned the independence of the commission. Members of the alliance argued that NEC is not independent because its top officials are appointed by the President, and hence tend to favour the ruling party because they serve under its government. They further argued that, for the NEC to be accepted and therefore be allowed to administer elections and establish the PVR, it has to be constituted by members, who are appointed in collaboration with political parties, as is the case in the Isles. They further suggested that the commission's chairperson should be elected by the first session of the reformed commission, and not be appointed by the President.

In February 2005, the Government tabled the 14th Constitutional Amendments Bill, which among other issues included a provision that one of the NEC members should come from the opposition camp. This provision was withdrawn despite a walkout by all but two opposition Members of Parliament for the reason that it would undermine the independence of the Commission.

It appears that opposition parties having grasped the potential advantages of the PVR were still posing questions on the credibility of the electoral commission. Even when the NEC invited political parties to a meeting to discuss the PVR on 12th May 2004, the issue of credibility of the commission arose again.²⁸ However, it seems opposition parties differed on the modality of pressing for an independent electoral commission. CHADEMA and CUF were opposed to the idea of taking NEC to court. On different occasions their spokespersons held that the reformation of

²⁵ TEMCO 2000 Report, p. 192

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ The opposition alliance, which met the Press at Maelezo Auditorium on 6th February 2004, was composed of UDP, TADEA, NLD, NCCR-Mageuzi, PPT-Maendeleo and UMD, FORD, Demokrasia Makini, UPDP.

NEC is a constitutional issue, and that it is no use to demand a 'new' NEC without addressing its legal basis, the country's constitution.²⁹ The issues were however allowed to stay in abeyance as all political parties participated in the preparation of the PVR. The National Electoral Commission made an effort to consult with different stakeholders, including Political Parties, the Media, NGOs, Members of Parliament, Government Officials, Religious leaders, Regional and District Education officers, and so on.

Things were completely different regarding local government elections. Two days before the registration process for the PVR got underway in the Southern Zone, twelve opposition political parties lodged a constitutional petition in the High Court of Tanzania seeking an order to call off local government polls, slated for November 21 and 28, 2004.³⁰ In the petition, the twelve political parties, among other issues, argued that provisions applied to conduct such elections violate Articles 5(1) to (3) and 13(6) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 as amended in 2000. The political parties claimed that they were aggrieved by the decision of the Minister of State in the President's office responsible for Regional Administration and Local Government, to ignore an agreement reached at a meeting in Dodoma on 17/4/2004 and 18/4/2004 to which CCM was also a party. In this meeting, political party leaders agreed that the November 2004 local government elections should be presided over by an independent electoral commission.

On the Mainland, there was a relatively low degree of mistrust towards the electoral commission compared to what was observed in the Isles. NEC was also able to deal effectively with any rational issues that were raised by the opposition. When the registration exercise commenced in the Coastal Zone³¹, the CUF Director of Elections, Khamis Katuga, claimed that the NEC conspired with CCM to deliberately issue its supporters in Dar es Salaam and Coast Regions with fake voter identify cards. Mr. Katuga was reported in a local newspaper from a press conference at the Tanzania information services auditorium in Dar es Salaam saying that CUF had recorded more than 156 false IDs, which were submitted to his office in Dar es Salaam.³² It is further reported that Katuga identified one such false ID card bearing registration number *99999999* issued to Abdallah Siri of Kilimahewa - Makurumla and Idrisa Haji of Mianzini - Kagera on March 30 and

²⁸ Mwananchi, 13th May 2004.

²⁹ Ibid. 15th May 2004.

³⁰ The 12 leaders who were complainants in the case with their parties in brackets are James Kabalo Mapalala (CHAUSTA); Prof. Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba (CUF); Lumuli Alipipi kasyupa (TLP); James Francis Mbatia (NCCR-Mageuzi); John Momose Cheyo (UDP); Rev. Christopher Mtikila (DP); Nassoro Fahami Dovutwa (UPDP); Godfrey Hicheka of Chama cha Demokrasia Makini (Makini); Rashid Mtuta (NRA); Peter Kuga Mziray (PPT-Mendeleo); John Lifa Chipaka (TADEA), and Dr. Emmanuel John Makaidi (NLD).

³¹ Registration of voters in the Coastal Zone started on 29 March 2005.

³² Ibid., April 9, 2005

31, respectively.³³ These allegations were dismissed by a NEC official as baseless stating that the IDs in question were actually specimen given to some people as part of voters' education. None of the TEMCO monitors could verify the allegations.

3.3 THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

In the past, among the factors that either motivated or discouraged turn out at registration centres were taxation and the timing of party campaigns. In the 1965 elections, for instance, registration of voters commenced on a slow pace partly because people suspected that the registration process was a ploy to identify tax defaulters. In the just completed registration exercise, this was not an issue as the development levy, had been scrapped.

It has also been noted that knowing party candidates and launching of campaigns have had an added incentive for people to register to vote in previous elections.³⁴ It cannot be said that this had an influence on the completed PVR though the registration exercise started almost a year ahead of campaigns when most of the parties had not nominated their candidates.

An interesting related development in the registration this time around has been a general massive turn out by youths to register in the PVR. Most of those interviewed by TEMCO monitors conceded to have been 'enticed' by the voters' registration cards, which they thought could be used as normal ID cards. The youth turnout seems to catch the interest of political parties. Political parties including CCM seem to reorient their focus towards attracting more youths to support them. In May 2005, the CCM Chairman, President Benjamin Mkapa while addressing its presidential nomination conference at Chimwaga in Dodoma, noted that it was necessary for the delegates to appreciate the fact that the composition of the electorate in Tanzania is currently dominated by young people. He, therefore, urged delegates to nominate a young contestant who is popular with the young generation. The CCM Chairman was reported to have said:

“Let us ask ourselves what young Tanzanians want from their leaders. If we give them what they want, or what will give them hope for the future, they will continue to vote for our candidate. If not, they will drift to the opposition”³⁵.

It also appears that expectations were high that NEC would carry out preparation of the permanent register competently and professionally. The chairperson of the CUF, Prof. Lipumba was reported to have said that the PVR would reduce vote rigging by Seventy-Five per cent.³⁶

³³ Ibid

³⁴ TEMCO 2000 report, p.49

³⁵ “Mkapa roots for Young Leadership”, The Guardian, 5th May 2005. See also Nipashe, same date.

3.3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATION OF PVR

Political Parties performed two major roles in preparation of the PVR in the Mainland. These are mobilization and monitoring roles.

Mobilization Role

Political Parties, particularly CCM and CUF, and to a limited extent CHADEMA, NCCR-MAGEUZI, TLP, UDP and CHAUSTA mobilized their followers to register through public meetings, rallies and House - to - House canvassing.

Public meetings and rallies appeared to be the most effective method used by political parties to attract their followers and the general public to come out in big numbers and register in the PVR. The top national leader of political parties especially, CCM and CUF, visited different registration zones and addressed public rallies urging those attending to register for the October General Election.

The other method used by political parties to mobilize people to register was House-to -House Canvassing. The local party organization formed Committees headed by own local party leaders to perform two main functions. In the first place, the committees dispatched members to persuade their followers to go and register in the PVR. CCM had special committees formed specifically for the mobilization task. These were formed and operated at the ‘ten cell’ and ward levels.

These Committees also supervised and monitored party agents’ placed at VRCs.

Committee members made a close follow up of the performance of their party agents. Where and whenever party agents’ follow-up of the monitoring exercise was found wanting, they were replaced immediately. In some areas of Morogoro, CCM agents were required to note their members who have registered. Party Committees made sure that every agent chosen for monitoring the registration exercise knew each and every CCM member in their locality.³⁷

There were no serious campaigns and rallies geared at mobilizing members and supporters for registration in the pre-registration period. Only a series of seminars to enlighten party leaders and followers of the responsibility to encourage fellow members to register in the PVR. The ruling party included the PVR issue among the resolutions reached in a seminar for the National

³⁶ Mtanzania, 22nd December 2004.

³⁷ TEMCO Regional observer’s report

Executive Council (NEC) members, and Regional Chairperson and party secretaries held at Chimwaga, in Dodoma on August 2004. In Temeke, for example, seminars were organized at district and ward levels to educate party leaders and agents on the PVR. Those who attended such seminars were asked to share information with their followers at the grassroots.

Most mobilization efforts focused more on mobilizing people to register than making them understand procedures, rules and process of registration, including the display of the Provisional PVR and objection process. CCM, however, in its *Mkereketwa Newsletter*, had published in detail qualities of an eligible voter; procedures to be followed for one to be registered in the PVR, and the objection process.³⁸

Monitoring Role

In the monitoring role, as mentioned earlier, only CCM and CUF had effective presence at the registration centres. The rest of the parties had negligible presence at VRCs. They were not able to place party agents even in Dar es Salaam where their headquarters are situated.

CCM placed its agents at almost all registration centres even where several centres were placed in the same room. While other parties had agents who visited the centres once per day or each week to collect data only, CCM had agents at registration centres most of the time. At Daraja Mbili in Arusha, opposition parties had one representative checking all the twelve registration centres.

The selective or non-participation of other parties in monitoring the registration process could be attributed to three main factors. First are financial limitations facing the parties since agents had to be paid allowances. CCM paid its agents a per diem allowance ranging from Tshs. 500 to 1000 per day.³⁹ In Kagera, it was observed that CCM's scheme of payment was not uniform throughout the region. For instance, those in Biharamulo East Constituency were being paid Tshs. 1000 per day, while those in Bukoba Urban pocketed Tshs. 500 per day. In Nkenge and Bukoba rural, it is alleged, agents were not paid at all. In Kilimanjaro payments paid to registration agents ranged from Tshs.500 to 800 a day. CUF on its part requested its members in Mwanza to donate some money and/or food for its agents

However, a general observation can be made that with the exception of CCM and CUF, other political parties did not give the voters' registration exercise a deserving attention. It also seems

³⁸ Jarida la Mkereketwa Toleo la Nne

³⁹ TEMCO Monitor's Report.

parties have reserved their resources for the up-coming campaign stage. Parties have strategically decided to conserve their resources and use them during campaigns for President, Parliament and councillorship. In an attempt to counter CCM's preparations for the campaigns, the CUF bought 200 motorcycles which are planned to be distributed to all 137 districts in the country in readiness for the campaigns of the party's presidential and parliamentary seats candidates. The CUF Director of Information and Publicity, Hiza Tambwe was reported to have said:

“Our archrivals, CCM, have bought cars for the campaigns but due to the financial limitations our party faces, we decided to buy these motorcycles for the same purpose”.⁴⁰

The consignment is said to have cost CUF Tshs. 130 million.⁴¹

The second factor, which led parties to participate selectively in monitoring the PVR, is weak political base and support. With the exception of CCM, opposition political parties featured agents at VRCs in areas where they consider being their strongholds. For instance, in Shinyanga where all registered political parties have their branch offices in every district, CHAUSTA and UDP had their permanent agents at all registration centres in Bariadi District. In Kibiti Constituency, Rufiji District, CHAUSTA had its agents in eleven registration centres out of fifty-seven Registration Centres. In Nyamagana Constituency of Mwanza region, CUF spent a great deal of time mobilizing the would-be voters to register in Milongo Ward, which is their stronghold. Political parties' motive for their involvement in preparation of the PVR was to see if the rules of the game were being adhered to by the registering authorities so as to ensure the smooth running of the exercise. This was evidenced by a generally cordial relationship between party agents at VRCs despite political rivalry.

A third related factor is the respect that opposition political parties have grudgingly accorded NEC over the years. As the performance of the National Electoral Commission in managing elections has improved, opposition parties have tended to relax a bit and let it do its work. As the elaborate registration procedures were unveiled and deployed by NEC, opposition parties slowly realised that the exercise was being managed efficiently and effectively and in a non-partisan way. No body was being turned away because of their political affiliations or inclinations.

⁴⁰ CUF Buys 200 bikes for the Campaigns, the Citizen, Saturday 19 March 2005.

⁴¹ Ibid.

4. CONCLUSION

Politics permeates voter registration. The voters' register may be a neutral tool in setting a democratic political system into operation. It can also be a potent instrument of exclusion of significant groups in the population through disenfranchisement on the basis of any convenient variable, the procedures that are deployed, incompetence, or the whims of those in whose hands control lies.

Voter registration in Tanzania Mainland was a contentious issue in the build-up to independence. This was due to the pursuit of multiracialism and the parity principle, which excluded a majority of the African population from the voters' electoral roll. Post independent governments have sought to mobilise and register all eligible voters. During the entire single party era, voter registration was never a contentious issue. Problems and complaints only arose at other stages of the election, especially voting, vote counting, and declaration of results.

The introduction of multipartism brought voter registration back into the limelight. Concerns regarding the neutrality of the election management body and the possibility of its manipulation by the ruling party led to calls for a PVR. These concerns were strengthened by problems in the 1995 elections.

The making of the PVR was not a hotly contested issue on the mainland. While some political parties registered their continued opposition to NEC as currently constituted, they all accorded it their support - tacit or express - in the making of the PVR. Some had a presence at the registration centres but most did not. NEC's professional handling of registration has gone a long way in depoliticizing the PVR on Tanzania mainland. The entire process was "Peaceful without the Police" as noted in one of TEMCO's newsletters.

CHAPTER TWO

MANAGEMENT OF THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER (PVR)

Introduction

In 2000, the government of Tanzania decided to have a permanent voters' register (PVR) which will guide the 2005 general elections and all other future elections in the country. In order to implement this decision, Article 5(3) of the Constitution was amended in January 2000. The Amendment provided a legal framework for the creation of a Permanent National Voters' Register. The Elections Act No. 1 of 1985, as amended in June 2004, empowered the National Election Commission (NEC) to, among other things, prepare and establish a PVR.

To NEC the process of creating a PVR was a novel exercise. Nonetheless, after all the technical aspects being in place, the process of creating a PVR started by registration of eligible voters throughout the country. The registration of voters was conducted in six zones comprising 21 regions of Tanzania Mainland. The registration exercised started on 7th October 2004 and was completed on 18th April 2005.

Being both novel and highly technical exercise, the most nagging question is how credible, transparent and authentic will the PVR be as legal document that will ensure and guarantee free and fair elections in the country. One of the most important prerequisites for creating such a document is the presence of efficient and effective management by NEC in the registration of voters, which is an important stage in the process of creating a PVR. It is the purpose of this report to assess the performance of NEC in managing the process of creating a PVR, in particular the registration of voters. In specific terms, the paper focuses on managerial and technical issues involved in the registration of voters.

In order to guide the assessment of the managerial and technical issues, we have adopted an operational definition of what is a PVR. Thus we define PVR as :


a glorified technical and administrative structure designed to collect, manipulate, store, maintain and retrieve data, which can process the information to produce various voters lists and reports required in the management of election activities.

The paper is divided into six sections. Section one describes the management system or network established by NEC to facilitate coordination, supervision and monitoring of the process of registration of voters. Section two provides an account on the registration centres in terms of their adequacy, location and accessibility in the four zones monitored by TEMCO. Section three assesses the training programme provided to the registration officers at all levels prior to conducting the registration exercise. The assessment focuses on the content, adequacy and duration of the training programme. Section four provides a detailed account on the distribution of the registration materials, their adequacy, and/or shortages and how these shortages were handled. Section five describes and assesses the registration process in terms of the competence of the Assistant Registration Officers (AROs) and camera operators, average duration taken to register a voter, compliance with the law in opening and closing the registration centres. Section six discusses the security of the registration materials, policing and monitoring by agents; viz. political parties, NGOs, CSOs etc. The paper concludes by making an overall assessment of the managerial and technical issues discussed in the paper.

2. Management/ Network System for Registration of Voters

In principle, management involves planning, budgeting, coordination, monitoring, communication and reporting. All these evolve around decision making by NEC on how the available resources (human and material) could be used efficiently and effectively in the process of registration of voters. To ensure this is achieved, NEC established a management/network system, which is illustratively shown in the chart below.

Chart 1: MANAGEMENT/NETWORK SYSTEM FOR VOTER REGISTRATION



In general the management system established by NEC proved quite effective and efficient in coordination, monitoring and supervision of the registration from the national to registration centre level. NEC and its secretariat got fully involved invariably prior, during and at the completion of registration of voters in all the regions. For example, NEC officials visited all the zones and several registration centres in the constituencies during the process of registration of voters. NEC provided

timely support and technical assistance whenever and wherever it was needed. For example, it was ready to send its technicians in any constituency to repair the cameras where they needed repairs. A direct communication system using landline, mobile phones was also established between the secretariat, regional and district headquarters and, where available, at ward level. This enabled NEC to respond quickly to every problem or request related to the registration of voters, as reported by any of the three levels below.

The Regional Elections Coordinator played also an effective role as a facilitator of registration process in the whole region under his/ her jurisdiction. As a facilitator he/she had to ensure that the process of registration of voters went smoothly and peacefully in the region.

The Registration Officer (RO) and his/her assistants managed the process at district/constituency level, ensuring that all registration centres were located in places as required by law; and that each centre had adequate registration materials. They acted as conveyor belt between the wards and registration centres to NEC. In general, they ensured that the registration materials were adequate in each constituency within the districts under their jurisdiction.

The Ward Executive Officers, and/or Ward Education Coordinators acted as moving ambassadors. They moved from one registration centre to another, distributing or recording shortages of registration materials within their wards. An overall assessment is that the management system was generally effective in almost every department of the registration process, except in the distribution of the registration materials. This will be discussed in section four.

3.0 Registration Centres

3.1 Adequacy of the Registration Centers

We have monitored registration of voters in 15 regions, two districts in each region, and two constituencies in each of the two districts, and 9 centres in three villages in each monitored constituency. The total number of the registration centres varied from district to district and one constituency to another depending upon the size of a district and estimated number of voters expected to be registered. Likewise, each registration centre had its own estimated size of population and estimated number of people expected to be registered. All these estimation were done by NEC using, apparently, the 2002 census.

With regard to the adequacy of the registration centres, we have observed three scenarios in all monitored constituencies and registration centres. First, there were general complaints by regional, district officials, and the public in general, that the number of registration centres in all

constituencies was less the number of registration centres allocated during the 2000 general elections, thus overlooking population increase in each of these constituencies. For example, in 2000, there were 248 registration centres in Bukoba rural constituency, whereas in 2005 there are only 206 registration centres. Biharamulo West and Eastern Constituencies had 111 and 172 registration centres in 2000, respectively. In 2005, only 81 and 148 registration centres were allocated in each constituency, respectively. Nkenge constituency had 120 registration centres in 2000, and only 93 registration centres in 2005. Arusha Municipality had 250 registration centres in 2000 as against 119 in 2005. In 2000 there were registration centres in the two islands in Mwibara Constituency, and Nyamguma Island in Bunda Constituency, as against none in 2005, thereby forcing people to cross over the Mainland by boats to register.

The second scenario is the congestion of registration centres in urban and semi-urban areas, as opposed to rural areas. In some urban areas even a number of registration centres shared the same premises/building. For example, registration centres no. A00180; B1001801; C00182; D001803; E001804 and F001805 in Daraja Mbili Ward in Arusha Municipality shared the same premise; i.e. the Ward Executive office building.

In contrast, in rural areas the registration centres were over crowded by people seeking to be registered largely due to inadequate registration centres, located far away from some residences. For example, at the registration centres of Nyakato Primary School, Gedeli and Pasiansi in Mwanza (rural), people had to wait for registration up to two days because of long queues. In Bukoba (rural) constituency, residents of Kangabusharo and Hamugende Villages had to walk a distance of 4-6 kms to the nearest registration centres which were located at Kungabusharo and Rwamishenye primary schools, respectively.

Kariwa in Moshi Rural and Lyasomboro in Vunjo had each two registration centres which were located at a distance between 6 to 8 kms from where the villagers resided. Likewise, in Rufiji constituency, residents of Nyali, Siasa, Luminzi and Kinyanya villages spent between 3-4 hours to the nearest registration centre.

Similar cases of inadequate registration centres were observed in Chinanguli in Chinolwa Constituency in Dodoma region; Kishangu, Mabonden, Aghondi, and Njiri in Manyoni West. In all these areas, people had to walk between 4-6 kms to the registration centres.

These are not just isolated cases. In most of the monitored constituencies, this has been a general picture one gets; that is, there were either fewer, or dispersed registration centres in the rural areas, than the case in the urban areas.

The third scenario observed is the non-compliance with NEC directives that all registration centres must be located in public and government buildings. There were a number of places where this requirement was not adhered to. For example, in Maore Ward, Same district, Iyoma, Mheza Chini and Nadarura registration centres were located in temporary small shelters, built with weak poles and thatched with dry grasses. The shelters appeared to be unsafe to the registration materials, especially in case of rain. In Bagamoyo, several registration centres, especially along the road were in open air under a mango-tree. Still others were located in unused godowns of private businessmen.

In Arusha Municipality, registration centres at AICC Nursery School A and B in Kaloleni ward, were in open air. Likewise, Meseran Juu, TMA Mwisho wa Lami, Lendkinga/Murandawa, Engikareti, Lelotikosh, and Mlimani Emurototo registration centres, in Monduli district, were located in open air under big trees. Others were located close to local beer drinking clubs; for example, Sinon Kusini, and Mlima Olkawa registration centres. Still others were located in Lutheran and Baptist Church buildings e.g. Orkesument, Hendkingka and Ollepesi registration centres. Apparently, in all these cases, there were no public/government buildings available in these areas.

In general, however, with the exception of few cases, most of the registration centres in the monitored constituencies were located in public and government buildings. In urban areas these centres were not only easily accessible, but also congested in several places. In contrast to rural areas, although they were accessible, several such centres were located in places of a long distance from the rural residences.

From the three scenarios discussed above, it is not possible to assess the adequacy or inadequacy of the registration centres in the monitored constituencies. One thing is obvious though; that is, the registration centres are fewer than those established for 2000 general elections. It is not clear why NEC decided to reduce the number of registration centres. The 2002 population census indicates that there has been a population growth in almost every district. Apart from the natural population increase, in some districts, the increase has been caused by migration of people from one district to

another. NEC should have taken this into consideration before deciding to reduce the number of registration centre.

This reduction has two serious implications. First, in areas where the registration centres are congested, and/or open air, voters on polling day will be crowded possibly with long queues. This might interfere the voting process and create chaos. In rural areas where registration centres are not only few but also far from residence the registered voters might abstain from voting. We, therefore, suggest that NEC should study both scenarios and take timely measures before the polling day.

4. Recruitment and Training of the Registration Officials

The entire registration process involved four main groups of registration officers. The first group are the Regional Elections Coordinators, refitted as Registration Officers, from the 21 regions and all City, Municipal, town, and district directors, as Assistant Registration Officers. These are appointees of NEC according to sections 7A(1) and 8 (1 and 2) of Acts No. 13 of 2004 and No. 8 of 1995, respectively. Prior to the commencement of the voter registration exercise in each region and district, they were trained through series of workshops and seminars in their role, responsibilities and functions, and other matters related to the registration of voters in their respective regions and districts/constituencies. The second group were the senior officers of the City, Municipal, Town and District Directors, including Ward Education Coordinators and Ward Executive Officers. These were recruited from within each district, city, municipal and town councils to assist the directors. Their training was conducted at each district level in the form of seminars and workshops for a period of 3 days. The training focused in all legal, administrative, operational and technical aspects of the voter registration process. After the training they became trainers of trainees of AROs and COs for the registration of voters in respective constituencies.

The third and fourth group is the AROS and Camera operators who actually registered voters in the registration centres. The AROs were recruited mainly from primary and secondary school teachers within each district/constituency; whereas the camera operators (COs) were recruited from within each district/constituency with either professional or amateur experience in photographing. Apart from education/professional qualifications, the applicants were required to demonstrate qualities of integrity, respect, confidence, commitment and non-partisan (i.e. holding no leadership position in any political parties, and be a resident within the constituency). The recruitment was done by the directors of city, municipal, town and district councils, after which NEC made a contractual agreement with the appointees as employees of NEC for the entire 21 days of registration of voters in each constituency.

The AROs were trained for a period of two days through seminars. The training was both theoretical and practical oriented, which addressed the following main areas:

- Laws and regulations governing the registration of voters in PVR.
- Voter registration centres and its staff
- Voters' registration materials
- Procedures and regulations on registering a voter
- Functions and responsibilities of AROs at the registration centre
- Code of conduct of AROs
- Roles of political parties agents in the registration centres
- Handling of cases, disputes/complaints, and/or appeals related to the registration of voters.

The practical training involved interviewing applicants for registration, filling in the various registration forms, shading and placing of thumb in a proper manner and familiarization with other accessories of the registration materials.

The camera operators were given a one day training in operating the cameras, including:

- Film fitting and removing
- Camera cleaning, especially the two lens
- Battery charging
- Photo fixing in the camera square
- Camera positioning or distancing.

The training was both theoretical and practical. Whether the training and its duration was adequate to instil competence and efficiency of AROs and COs, this will be discussed under section five.

5. Distribution of Registration Materials

5.1 Mechanisms for Distribution of Materials

This section assesses whether or not registration materials were adequate. We will also analyse the efficiency in the distribution, collection and shortages experienced in various monitored constituencies. The mechanism established by NEC for distributing the registration materials involved three distribution points. The first point is NEC headquarters where registration materials were packed and transported to each district headquarters. The second point is the district headquarters from where registration materials were distributed to Ward Executive Office in each constituency. The third point is the Ward Executive Office which distributed the registration materials to each registration centre.

In order to facilitate the distribution of the registration materials within the constituency, a dependable vehicle (Land cruiser) was availed to AROs for that purpose. The Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) and/or Ward Education Coordinators (WECs) were facilitated with motorcycles which enabled them to move easily from one centre to another within their wards.

5.2 Adequacy of the Supplied Registration Materials

In all monitored constituencies, registration materials were quite adequate in the first and mid-way of the second week of the registration process. Thereafter, there were cases of inadequacy in some constituencies with variations among the constituencies, as well as among the urban and rural areas. Another problem experienced in several areas of registration of voters is frequent breakdown of cameras. For example, reports from the Lake Zone indicate that about 50% of the reported cases of interruptions of the registration process, has been attributed to inadequate distribution of registration materials. The problem was more acute in centres located in the remote rural areas. Table 1, 2 and 3 below present a general picture of the seriousness of the problem as it existed invariably in the monitored constituencies.

Table 1: Observation on Missing of Registration Materials in Coast Region – Coastal Zone

Date	Reg. Centres	Reg. No.	Missing materials	Consequences
2 & 8/4/05	Mwembe Mohoro	006996	Films	Registration suspended for 4-6 hrs
5/4/05	Central Umwe	006994	Registration Form 1	Registration stopped for several hours
6-8/4/05	Kijiweni	006997	Registration Form 1	Registration suspended for 2-3 hours each of these dates
7-10/4/05	Rest House Ndogo	006993	Registration form 1	as above
8/4/05	Azimio	006995	Registration form 1	as above
9/4/05	Limbele (Kibiti)	006998	Registration form 1	Registration suspended for three hours.
5/4/05	Kibiti Secondary School	007048	Films & Form 1	Registration suspended for four hours in each of these dates
8/4/05	Kibiti Secondary School	007048	Photo Fix & Film	
11/4/05	Kibiti Secondary School	007048		
14/4/05	Kibiti Secondary School	007048		
15/3/05	Maliasili	007042	Lamination, glue and form 1	Registration suspended for six hours
13/4/05	Laminzi	007056	Envelopes no 8 and 9 and form 1	Registration suspended for a day
9/4/05	Chama cha Walimu	007070	Films, photo fix	Registration suspended for four hours
11-11/4/05	Kinyunya	007047	Pencils for shading photo fix	Registration suspended for a day

Source: TEMCO Monitors' Weekly Reports, 2005.

Table 2: Observation on Missing of Registration Materials in Dar es Salaam Region- Coastal Zone

Date	Reg. Centres	Reg. No.	Missing materials	Consequences
1/04/05	WEO's office	007746	Glue	Registration was halted for 30 minutes
	Hospital Amana	007741	Glue	Registration was halted for 30 minutes
3/04.05	Misewe	007850	Glue	Registration was suspended between for three hours (1300-1600 hrs)
7/4/05	Liwiti Primary School 'A'	007850	photo films, photo fixes	Registration was suspended from 1530-1800 hrs
	Misewe Primary School	007850	Ink pad	Registration was suspended from 1600-1800 hrs
	NBC Dispensary 'A'	007856	photo films	Registration was suspended from 1600 -1800 hrs
11/4/05	Liwiti Primary School 'A'	007847	Lamination pouches and photo films	Registration was suspended from 1200. It was resumed at 1600 hrs when the materials were supplied
	Misewe Primary School	007850	Lamination pouches and photo films	Registration was suspended from 1200. It was resumed at 1600 hrs when the materials were supplied.
	NBC dispensary	007856	Registration books	Registration was suspended from about 1200 hrs until 1615 hrs when the books were supplied
14/04/05	Boma Shule ya Msingi	007737	Lamination pouches	The exercise was halted for 20 minutes
15/04/05	Boma Shule ya Msingi	007737	Pens, ink pad photo fix, Form No. 1, lamination pouched	Exercise halted for one hour, i.e. from 1000-1100 hours
15/04/05	Misewe Primary School	007850	Form No. 1	Exercise suspended for two hours, i.e. from 1530-1730 hours
15/04/05	Liwiti Primary School 'A'	007847	photo films	Exercise halted for about 5 minutes
16/04/05	Shule ya Msingi Kisukulu 'A'	007843	photo films	Exercise suspended for two hours, i.e. from 0900-1000 hrs.
16/04/05	Shule ya msingi Kisukulu 'B'	024236	Camera batteries	Exercise suspended for one hour, i.e. from 1400-15000 hours
18/04/05	Shule ya Mmsingi Kisukulu 'A'	007843	Camera batteries	Exercise suspended for one hour, i.e. from 1400-1500 hours
	Shule ya Msingi Kisukulu 'B'	024236	photo films	Exercise suspended for two hours, i.e. from 0800-1000 hours
18/04/05	Hekima 'A'	024284	Lamination pouches	Exercise halted for about 5 minutes.

Source: TEMCO Monitors Weekly Reports, 2005

Table 3: Observation on Missing Registration Materials in up-country zones

Date	Reg. Centres	Reg. No.	Missing materials	Consequences
6-11/3/05	Moshi Shaurimoyo Primary School. Sabasaba Dispensary. Korongu Primary School. Pasua and Longuo 'B'. Mlupanga Primary School	-	Films, format, photo fix, glue sticks and lamination poaches	Registration disrupted between 2-4 hours everyday
5-8/3/05	Vunjo Constituency Rauya Primary School	- -	Lamination poaches photo fix, pencils for shading	Registration disrupted about 2-4 hrs everyday
31/1/05	Bukoba Rwamishenye Health Centre	1806107002	Films and photo fix Form 1, films, glue, peas, ink, lamination	Registration stopped for a day
23/1/05	Ghala la Pamba Kijiji Chato Primary School Biharamulo Primary School	020103 020102 020708 019921		Registration stopped for a day.
15/1/05	Bunda Mwakawa Mtoto	022889	Form I, glue stick, breakdown of camera	Registration stopped for six hours.
24/4/05	Kibara Chekechea	-	Lamination, form 1, glue.	Registration stopped for 7 hours.
29/1/05	Guta	023015	Lamination and film	Registration stopped for 2 hours
22/2/05	Handeni Mgambo Kabuku Kwedizinga Michungwani Michungwani Primary School	00424692 004670 004648 004666 004665	Photo fix, Form 1, films Glue, lamination Poach	Registration stopped for the whole day
7-8/3/05	Muheza VEO-Muheza chini VEO – Mheza A Muheza Primary School	-	Various registration materials	Registration suspended
5-8/3/05				
23/2 to 1/2/05	Handeni Kwamatuka Ofisi ya Kijiji Kwamatuka Primary School Kisimani	04060/1170 02 04060/1170 03 04060/1170 04	Various registration materials	Registration halted for two consecutive days

22- 23/1/05	ILEMELA Kinemba Dispensary 'A'	020876	Various (Nations materials)	Registration halted for two consecutive days
“	Gedeli Primary school	021030	“	
“	Isenga 'A' Primary School	021052	“	
16/1/05	Nyakato Primary School	021031	No voter registers	Registration stopped for six hours

Source: TEMCO Monitors' Weekly Reports 2004/05

A combination of factors could have been the genesis of this problem. first, underestimation of eligible voters to be registered in each constituency, and in each registration centre. If the estimation of eligible voters was premised on the 2002 population census, then in several regions the figures were outdated due to population movements. The districts which have recorded over and above 100% of the estimated targets of registered voters, tend to support this observation. This, in turn has led to undersupply of registration.

Secondly, in some regions/districts NEC estimated figures of eligible voters were different from those produced by the regions/districts themselves, because these regions/districts had taken into account the population changes within the different areas. For example, the projection by NEC for Ngamagama and Ilemela Constituencies in Mwanza Region, was 264,000 eligible voters. Whereas, the projection by the regional administration (which was clearly more accurate) was 305, 000 eligible voters. At the completion of the exercise, 276,508 were registered, which is 103.98% over NEC's estimated target. Consequently, shortages of registration materials were experienced by several registration centres in these two constituencies.

Another factor could be just a result of careless packing of the registration materials at the first distribution point; or repacking at the second distribution point. Reports from TEMCO monitors indicate that registration materials commonly missing, include Form 1, 5A and 5B, glue sticks, wizard glue, ink, photo fix, lamination pouches, films, envelopes no. 8, pencils, Polaroid films, and so forth.

The fourth factor is poor communication, particularly roads within a given district/constituency. For example, in Rufiji and Kibiti constituencies, several registration centres could not be reached whenever it rained; because, more often than not, the rains caused floods from Rufiji river, and the roads become impassable.

The last, but not least, is sheer inefficiency by AROs responsible for distributing the registration materials to the registration centres, on one hand, and inert intuition on the part of the AROs at the registration centres, on the other hand. After closing hours of the registration centre, the AROs are supposed to take stock of the registration materials required for the next day. Had the AROs been efficient in taking accurate stock, shortages of registration materials would not have been a serious problem, at least not in Dar es Salaam centres which are at door mouth of the first distribution point.

We mentioned early the problems of frequent breakdown of the camera. Reports from the different monitored constituencies indicate that about 30% of cases of interruptions of registration of voters, were caused by malfunctioning, and/or technical failure of the cameras; poor skills of COs in handling minor technical problems; and negligence on the part of COs in timely charging the batteries. For example, in Kilimanjaro Region 62 cameras were reported to have developed technical problems, and could not be used any more for the registration exercise. In Same, 126 cameras were out of order, only to be replaced by 49 cameras. In Arumeru, about 70% of registration interruptions were largely due to the breakdown of the cameras.

The reasons for frequent breakdowns are multiple. The main ones include, inadequate knowledge and experience of the camera operators in handling Polaroid cameras; and defective cameras due to lack of and/or improper servicing of the cameras, especially those used previously in other zones.

On overall assessment, however, the registration materials were adequately supplied in most of the constituencies and registration centres. Where shortages occurred, they were handled immediately by AROs and WEOs/WECs to minimize disruptions of the registration of voters. NEC technicians were also sent to the areas to handle major technical defects of the cameras, which could not be corrected by the camera operators in the field.

6. The Registration Process

6.1 Competence of the AROs and Cos

The process of registering a voter was estimated at between 5-8 minutes where AROs and COs demonstrated maximum competence and efficiency. Reports from most of the monitored constituencies indicated that during the first week of registration, the minimum time taken to register a voter was between 10-15 minutes.

Several reasons accounted for this inefficiency. First, many AROs were not quite familiar yet with the registration materials and the work involved in registering a voter. Consequently, they made

many errors in recording the information of voters in the OMR. The following examples are illustrative.

In Bunda Constituency, 250 people registered in the first week had to be called for re-registration, because their thumb fingers were improperly placed in OMR forms. In Tanga constituency, spoiled OMR during the first 3 days were as follows from some of the reported registration centres: 143 in Ngamiani Primary School Centre “C”; 65 in Sahara Primary School Centre (004300); 120 in Sahara Primary School Centre no 004403; 144 in Chuma Primary School “B” centre; and 134 in Kwanjeka Primary School ‘A’ centre.

In Handeni constituency, 58 OMR forms, 15 photographs and 3 films were spoiled during the first 2 day of registration, in Kilimilang’ombe Primary School Centre no 004536. Likewise, in the same registration centre, 55 voters’ certificates had serious problem; i.e. in the 18 certificates, the centre was wrongly written as Kilimilangombe; while in the other 37, the centre was written as Kilimiling’ombe on one side, Kilimilangombe on the other side. And in all certificates the thumbs were improperly placed.

In Moshi, the AROs at Kambi ya Vichaa, Karakana, Korongoni, Police Post and Rau Dispensary Centers were reported to have destroyed several registration materials, especially Form I, in the first week of the registration process. Similarly, in Urambo East Constituency, two books of Form 1 were spoiled in Uhuru Primary School Centre during the first two days of the registration process. The same was observed in Urambo West, where 20 films, in Kisanjandaga registration centre were spoiled, and several people in that centre had to be re-registered.

The second reason was that the camera operators were by then not quite competent in handling the cameras, especially, Polaroid cameras. Thus during the first days of registration, many of them produced applicants’ pictures which could not be used for the registration purposes.

And the third reason was ignorance of most of the applicants on the rules and procedures of the registration of voters. Voter education provided by NEC and other stakeholders seemed to have emphasized on the mobilizing people to register, and not on how to register. This ignorance made the AROs to take extra efforts and time in explaining the applicants on the procedures of registration.

However, during the second week and thereafter competence and efficiency of AROs and COs improved tremendously, taking an average of 5-10 minutes to register a voter; and on average applicants spent about 30-40 minutes on a queue before being registered.

6.2 Compliance with the Law governing Registration

According to the law, all registration centres, should be open from 8.00 a.m. and close at 6.00 p.m. In most registration centre observed in the monitored constituencies, the AROs and COs complied with this law. However, some centres had to close after 6.00 p.m. to complete registering those who had been in the queue by 6.00p.m. There were still other centres which decided to list all unregistered applicants in queue by 6p.m. and were given first priority on the following day of registration between 08.00-09.00a.m. This helped to calm down applicants who were upset for not being registered after spending considerable time in a queue.

7. Security and Monitoring

In general, the registration of voters was conducted peacefully and with tranquility without the police force. Reports from all constituencies monitored by TEMCO have recorded minor isolated incidences which, however, did disrupt the registration process, nor cause registration centres to be closed. Likewise, TEMCO monitors did not spot any physical presence of uniformed police force, and/or militia in any of the monitored registration centres in the monitored constituencies, although the registration officers were free to call for assistance of the police, or militia in the event of disturbance. Likewise, there was no coercion, threat, or intimidation voters by political parties, and/or group of fanatics, reported by TEMCO monitors from any of the minored constituencies. In short, a peaceful environment prevailed in the registration centres throughout the monitored constituencies.

With regard to the security of registration materials, each Assistant Registrations officer and camera operator kept in custody in his/her house residence all registration materials which were to be used on the next morning of the registration process. This was in compliance with their oath taken before the registration exercise. The oath tied the responsibility and accountability of the registration materials in use to each ARO and CO, in case of loss of any of the registration materials. The completed voter registers were kept under the custody of the city, municipal, town, district directors' offices which also compiled weekly statistics of the registered voters in each centre and in the constituencies within the district.

The registration materials for refurbishing the registration centres were kept at the district headquarters; whereas those needed for replenishing the registration centres on daily basis, were

kept in ward executive offices, or primary school offices with reliable security. This arrangement guaranteed the safety of the registration materials and their collection from the registration centres to the wards, and later on to the district.

The full time monitoring in each registration centre was done by two AROs and a camera operator. Others were the WEOs, CEOs who made periodical visits at the centres under their jurisdiction to ensure that the registration of voters is conducted smoothly and peacefully. Likewise, the ROs and AROs at the district level paid occasional visits to the registration centres, particularly when responding to problem which needed immediate action or measures from the registration centres.

The presence of agents of political parties in each registration centre was also another mechanism for monitoring the registration process. According to the directives of NEC, political party agents were required to be present in each registration centre throughout the period of registration process to observe, monitor and ensure that the laws, regulations and procedures for registration of voters are complied with by AROs and COs. These agents, however, must be residents within the areas where the registration centres are located, so that they could also assist in identifying applicants with dubious residence, and/or non-residents.

Unfortunately, the participation of political parties in this exercise was extremely low. Reports from TEMCO monitors indicate that only CCM managed to place its agents in all registrations centres throughout the monitored constituencies, and throughout the whole period of the registration process. Other political parties, such as CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-MAGEUZI, UDP and TLP had their agents dispersely placed in some areas or constituencies where they commanded strong support. Surprisingly, the political parties failed to place their agents even in Dar es Salaam Region where their headquarters are situated. For example, only CCM and CUF had their agents in each registration centre throughout the region.

The low participation of the political parties in the registration process could be explained by a number of factors including lack of human and financial resources and weak institutional base and support at the grassroots level. Whichever factor that may account for this, the fact remains that the political parties have blown up a golden opportunity in monitoring and observing the preparation of PVR to ensure its transparency, credibility and authenticity as an instrument for guiding free and fair 2005 general elections and all other future elections in Tanzania.

Conclusion

The registration of voter, as the first stage in the preparation of PVR, was completed in Tanzania Mainland on 18 April, 2005. From the 15 regions where the registration process has been observed and monitored by TEMCO, we can draw a number lessons learnt from the entire process.

One, the management system/network established by NEC for coordinating, supervising and monitoring the registration process, has to a large extent, contributed to the successful completion of registration of voters in Tanzania Mainland. Although it did not excel in every department of the managerial and technical aspects of the process, the networking from the national down to registration centres in the field, facilitated coordination and monitoring at all level. It also enabled NEC to respond promptly to any problem that arose anywhere in the field.

Two, the NEC officers at all levels, particularly the AROs and COs at the registration centres, demonstrated a high degree of commitment, loyalty and diligence in the registration of voters throughout the 21 days period of registration. There were no complaints registered by the applicants in the monitored constituencies against these officers concerning any misbehaviour of one sort or another. Likewise, they have demonstrated non-partisanship in conducting the registration of voters.

Three, the registration process has been conducted and completed in a peaceful and tranquil environment in the whole country. This is a sign of political maturity of and importance the people have attached in cooperating with NEC and its officers, in the preparation of PVR. Likewise, it demonstrated a maturity of political tolerance among political parties by letting their members and people in general to freely register without coercion, threats or intimidation of any kind.

Four, although the management system was in place, the registration process was faced with unanticipated problems. These include allocation of fewer registration centres than those allocated in 2000 general elections; unbalanced distribution of registration centres between the rural and urban areas and shortages of registration materials. We expect that NEC will seriously study these problems and take corrective measures before the October 30 general elections.

Since the same registration centers will be transformed into polling stations, we suggest that NEC revisits the current numbers of registration centers, and establish centres adjacent to the existing ones. This will alleviate congestion and long queues noted during the registration process.

Lastly, NEC has overlooked the intensity and magnitude of the workload involved in the registration of voters. Each registration centre had two AROs and one camera operator, working non-stop from 8.00 to 6.00 p.m. This assumed that these officers needed no break for lunch and other nature requirements. In most of the rural areas it was even impossible to find a canteen or kiosk to purchase meals. In short, these officers were working under hard conditions and environment, because in almost all registration centres in the monitored constituencies, the number of officers was not commensurate with the workload. Consequently, in almost all registration centres observed the task of shading the forms was not completed even after the end of the registration period. Examples across the monitored centre are illustrative. In Nzega (urban) 42 books were unshaded at the end of the registration process on 25/12/04; 65% of Forms 1 were not shaded by the end of the exercise in all registration centres in Shinyanga (urban) constituency. Reports from Moshi (rural) and Same District indicate that most of the shading process was mostly done in the 3rd week of registration when voters attendance started to slow down. To alleviate the problem temporary staff (mostly teachers) and camera operators were called in to assist in shading the forms.

Similar cases were found in Dar es Salaam region. In registration centres of Temeke B, a total of 2,900 sheets were still unshaded at the end of the registration period on 18 April, 2005. AROs illegally used party agents to help them with the shading exercise. This was a serious problem to the extent that it was reported in some newspapers that some AROs used primary school pupils to complete the shading task.

We suggest that NEC should revisit the workload of the polling day to ensure that all that is involved during and after voting is accomplished within the required period.

In conclusion, despite the ups and downs experienced during the voter registration of voters, we can generally conclude that the management of the registration process by NEC was good. It managed to coordinate, supervise, and monitor the process in such a way that it successfully completed in a peaceful and tranquil environment. Likewise the process was conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner. NEC and all other stakeholders need to be commended for the good work for successfully accomplishing this novel and historical voter registration process in Tanzania Mainland.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER: COMPLAINTS, OBJECTIONS, AND THEIR RESOLUTIONS

Introduction

Voter registration is a critical stage for the realization of free and fair elections. It can be done in temporary or permanent voters' register. Tanzania has been using temporary voters' register since independence. The 2005 general elections are going to be the first elections in which the Permanent Voters' Register (PVR) is going to be used. The adoption of Permanent Voters Register in Tanzania is expected to enhance the degree of fairness and freeness in elections. However, free and fair elections can be achieved *inter alia* if the registration process is in the first place free and fair. There are several indicators that can be used to assess whether the registration process is free and fair. Among the major indicators include the presence of a fair and efficient mechanism for handling complaints. It is interesting to note that while a complaints handling system can in principle be very elaborate, in practice things may be different. This paper is about complaints, objections and their resolutions as they unravelled during the PVR exercise in the Tanzania Mainland. Among the questions we attempt to answer include to what extent the practices related to handling of complaints and objections matched with the prescribed principles? Was the system for handling complaints and objections transparent, efficient and fair? To accomplish this task the paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the formal way of handling complaints and their limitations. The second section presents the actual practice in handling complaints and a menu of complaints and the way they were resolved.

Formal Mechanism for Handling Complaints

Complaints are part and parcel of competitive games. In this respect, ideally all competitive games should provide mechanisms for handling complaints. Multiparty politics like any other competitive games are governed by rules of the game. Elections which are pivotal in multiparty politics are guided by the Constitution, electoral laws and guidelines provided by institutions mandated to manage elections. These rules of the game also provide mechanism for handling various issues including complaints. In Tanzania the Elections Act No 1 of 1985 as amended up to and including 30th April 2005 among other things provides mechanism for handling complaints during registration process including objections. Complaints related to registration process can be grouped into two categories. First are complaints related to the management of the registration process. These were complaints which applicants or voters levelled against registration officers or the registration system in general. Additionally, they include complaints that Registration Officers and

Assistant Registration Officers had against the National Electoral Commission. Second were objections. These were complaints against applicants or registered voters.

The 1985 Elections Act focuses more on objections rather than complaints related to the management of registration process. Most of the complaints or objections that were aired relate to qualifications for registration. Section 11 of the 1985 Elections Act provides factors that can disqualify an applicant from being registered. An applicant can be refused to be registered if: is not a Tanzanian citizen; would be below the age of eighteen years by the voting date; is of unsound mind; is in detention; has a death sentence; is under a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months and is serving a sentence on offences related to election. A person meeting any of these qualifications is not supposed to be registered. However, due to dishonest/ignorance/lack of information, some unqualified applicants can find their way into the register. The display of Provisional Voters' Register for inspection is expected to provide avenue for registered voters to pinpoint such anomalies including corrections of their own registration records as the case may be.

Objections and Mechanism for Handling them

Voters' Registration: Objections Handling Mechanism

Permanent Voters' Register registration process allows for two levels of objections. The first level is when an applicant is applying for registration and the second level is when the Provisional Voters' Register is displayed for voters to verify registered voters including their own records. At the first level the Assistant Registration Officer and party agents can file objections. Objections by party agents have to satisfy the Assistant Registration Officer for the later to effect it. If the Assistant Registration Officer is not satisfied then the party agents has to wait and file his/her objections when the Provisional Voters' Register is displayed for inspection by voters.

When the Assistant Registration Officer is satisfied with the objection the applicant will not be registered. Section 21(1) of the 1985 Elections Act states that; "Where a Registration Officer refuses an application under the provisions of this Part, he shall, if so required by the applicant, give to the applicant a written statement in the prescribed form setting out the grounds of his refusal, and where any applicant aggrieved by such refusal may, within fourteen days after receipt of such statement, appeal against such refusal to a District Court." The District Court is required by the provision of the Act, section 21(2) to determine such appeal within fourteen days of submission of the appeal. The Decision of the District Court is final.

The Provisional Voters' Register: Mechanism for Handling Objections

The second level of objections is done when the Provisional Voters' Register is displayed for inspection. The law requires the Provisional Voters' Register to be displayed for seven days. At this level, registered voters, the Director of Elections and Registration Officers have been granted powers to object registered voters. Every objection submitted to the Registration Officer is required to be in duplicate and be accompanied by a deposit of such sum as the Commission may prescribe. After receiving the objection the Registration Officer is required to send a notice of such objection to the objected person.

Section 26 of the 1985 Elections Act requires the Registration Officer to hold a public inquiry into all objections made as soon as practicable. The Registration Officer is also required to issue a written notice of not less than seven days' to each objector and the objected specifying the date, time and place at which the inquiry will be conducted. The Registration Officer shall decide on the objection made to the Provisional Voters' Register within seven days from the last day of the issuance of the notice of inquiry

Where the Registration Officer is satisfied with the proof given at the public inquiry, he or she is required to inform the Director of Elections of the same and the Director of Elections shall retain or include such person's name in the Provisional Voters' Register. In case the Registration Officer is not satisfied with evidence given, he/she is required to inform the Director of Elections of his/her decision and the Director of Elections shall delete such person's name in the Provisional Voters' Register. In case the objector or his agent does not appear to provide proof to the satisfaction of the Registration Officer, the Registration Officer shall disregard the complaint.

Where an objection is approved by the Registration Officer and in his opinion, the objection was made without reasonable cause, the Registration Officer may, if he thinks fit, order in writing the objector to pay the objected, compensation in such sum as the Commission may prescribe. Also, Registration Officer may order the deposit paid by the objector be forfeited to the Government or be refunded as the case may be.

Section 27 of the 1985 Elections Act allows a person (the objector or the objected) dissatisfied with the decision of the Registration Officer to file an appeal to a District Court within seven days from the date such decision was made. All appeals are required to state briefly the grounds of appeal, and shall be accompanied by such sum as the Commission may prescribe as a deposit. The District Magistrate shall hear every such appeal in public, giving notice of the time, date and place of the

hearing of the appeal to the parties concerned. The District magistrate may decide whether to hear or not to hear any evidence. The District Court is bound by law to determine such an appeal within fourteen days from the date of submission. It is also important to note that the decision of the District Magistrate regarding the appeal is final.

The District Magistrate is required to forward to the Registration Officer his /her decision in a written statement showing the names to be deleted/retained/ included in the Provisional Voters' Register. Upon receipt of the District Magistrate statement, the Registration Officer shall inform the Director of Elections on the result of the appeal and the Director of Elections shall amend the Provisional Voters' Register accordingly. The District Magistrate may order that any deposit be forfeited or any sum of money be paid by way of compensation in accordance with an order of the Registration Officer or such sum as the District Magistrate may specify.

It is important here to raise two systemic problems related to objections handling mechanisms. First, the law requires that applicants who are refused to register to request Assistant Registration Officers to give them a written statement in a prescribed form. However, given the low level of civic competence among Tanzanians (particularly among the rural residents) most people may not know that they have to request a written statement if they are refused to register. Failure to get such a statement may dis-grant them their appeal right. The experience of Zanzibar registration process shows that AROs can use that loophole for their political interest. To avoid such abuses, it would have been fair if the law would have required Assistant Registration Officers to give a written statement in a prescribed form all applicants who have been refused to be registered.

Second, all appeals are required to be filled with District Courts. The cost involved in processing appeal particularly for citizens living far away from the district headquarter is so high that some people who were refused to be registered or who were objected may lack the incentive to appeal. In Zanzibar where each vote counts respective political parties have incentive to finance appeals of their rejected or objected members and supporters. Political parties in the mainland lack such incentive as losing a hundred to a thousand votes may not matter in the final results. There is a need to reconsider and see if some of these objections/complaints can be handled by primary Courts.

Objections, Complaints and their Resolution during Registration

It should be noted that about 80% of the centres observed by TEMCO personnel had no any serious complaint. In this respect, only 20% of the observed centres experienced complaints. Complaints that were registered by TEMCO observers in different constituencies they monitored can be

grouped into two categories. The first were managerial complaints. These include complaints no. 2 - 6 in Table 1. The second category are those complaints that require filling of objection forms (Form no. 3) and these include complaints no. 7 – 9 as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Types of Complaints Reported

	Types of Complaints	Number of Centres Observed	%
1.	No Complaints	524	80.8
2.	Inadequate Registration Material	28	4.3
3.	Pairing in Taking Photographs	15	2.3
4.	Distance to registration Centres	5	0.8
5.	Overcrowded centres/Long queues	17	2.6
6.	Complaints Related to Less payments	26	4.0
7.	Moslem Women Refusing to Uncover their Faces to Take Photograph	2	0.3
8.	Underage	4	0.6
9.	Non-Citizens	9	1.4
10	Others	19	2.9
	Total	649	100

Complaints Related to management of the Registration process

- **Overcrowded Registration Centres**

In most constituencies, there were few centres which were overcrowded. These centres witnessed long queues. In certain centres people had to stand in queue for one to two hours before they could be registered. Many people complained about the time wasted on queues. In other areas, such as in Ilala and Temeke districts this was resolved partly by allocating reserve AROs to registration centres with long queues. The problem of overcrowded centres was a partly due to the manner registration centres were located. Some registration centres had too many applicants whereas others had very few applicants. For example in Ilemela and Morogoro south constituencies some centres registered up to 140 applicants while other centres registered up to five applicants a day.

- **Shortage of Registration Materials**

This was a common complaint in all constituencies we observed. Most Assistant Registration officers complained about shortage of registration materials such as glues and pens. Some had to buy them with their own money. In certain centres in Kibiti, Rufiji Ilala, Temeke etc, constituencies registration exercise had to be suspended for several hours. This problem was prevalent in almost all districts. Shortages were partly due to underestimations of eligible voters. In Urban areas it was easy for the Registration Officer to replenish the stock due to easiness in communication. However, in rural areas some centres had to close for up to two days due to shortages in material. For example, Mairouwa Shuleni, Mairouwa Ngoswaki in

Monduli constituency, similar problem was experienced in the two Nzega district constituencies and Kibiti constituencies. People who were told to go back complained bitterly for wastage of time. Some of them feared that they may not be able to register at all. However, when the materials were replenished they were registered.

- **AROs' Daily Allowance**

Most AROs claimed that the daily allowance they received was not commensurate with the workload and their daily expenses. On the last day of the registration exercise (18th April, 2005) most of the AROs had not completed the transferring of applicants' data from Form IA to Form IB. Moreover, all AROs in the centres we observed had not completed the 'shading' work in the registration books. AROs were paid 5000/= Tshs per day. The complaint was not resolved partly because NEC had to pay them from what they were budgeted.

- **The Hijab Issue**

Some Muslim leaders and women complained about the photographing of Muslim women without covering their faces. To resolve such complaint NEC gave directive to all Assistant Registration Officers on how women with Hijab should be photographed. Most Muslim leaders and women agreed with NEC 's prescription. However, some few women refused to abide to NEC's directives and they were not registered. In Babati and Nzega constituencies three women were refused to register because they could not agree to take pictures in accordance with the NEC directed way. In other cases, such as Buguruni Primary School, Ilala district women agreed to dress their hijab in the NEC directed way after a long discussion with AROs.

- **Disabled People**

The disabled associations particularly those of the deaf and dumb complained because most of the information given by NEC could not reach them. In Tanga district the disabled association for deaf people threatened to take NEC to court for failure to cater for their needs. It seems many deaf people were not registered because of communication barrier. However, in few cases such as in Babati market centre a deaf person was registered after he brought his son (as an interpreter). This happened after ARO refused to register him earlier on because of communication problem. In this regard, there is a need for NEC to make a special arrangement to cater for the needs of the disabled persons of varieties of types in the future.

- **Distance from Residences to Registration Centres**

Some applicants complained about long distance from their residence to registration centre. Some applicants had to walk for between four and six hours to reach the nearby registration centre. For example in Nyasa and Siasa villages in Rufiji constituency applicants had to walk for about five hours to registration centres at Lumionzi, Kitembo, Zimwani and Kikuta. In Mwibara constituency applicants from Namguma Island had to go to Kibara cluster or Kibala Chekechea registration centres which were very far. Most of these applicants may not appear for voting if that problem is not solved. Some of them said that they had decided to go to register because they wanted identity cards. Voters affected by this problem need a different incentive to for them to go to vote. This makes us conclude that NEC need to re-assess and re-locate some of the registration centres to reduce complaints during the voting stage.

- **Opposition-CCM Relations**

In constituencies were the difference between opposition and CCM supporters was negligible (measured by the results of the last elections) such as Bukoba Urban, Tarime, Temeke and Mwibara political parties (mainly CCM and CUF) registered formal complaints against supporters of other parties. CUF, for example, lodged complaints to the Returning Officer of Temeke and Bukoba Urban constituencies. In Bukoba urban constituency CUF complained that CCM supporters remained in the vicinity of registration centres and have been blocking some people to register. Also CUF complained that CCM party agents were infringing the powers of Assistant Registration Officer. In Rwamishenye Health centre station the CCM party agent threatened to inform the DC if the Assistant registration Officer would allow people whom the party agent thought were not eligible for registration. Many of those objected were youth whom he thought were CUF supporters. However, the Assistant Registration Officer neglected the threat given by party agents. In Mwibara constituency supporters of NCCR-Mageuzi were accused of bringing chaos in some of the registration centres. The Assistant Returning Officer filed formal complaints against NCCR-Mageuzi to the police.

- **Complaint about Lost Voter's Card**

Some people who lost their voter card did not know what to do. Section 18 of the Elections Act 1985 stipulates that in a situation where a person voter's card is lost, defaced or destroyed such a person can apply in person to the Registration Officer for the issue of new voter's card. The Registration officer may issue a new voter's card if the applicant remains qualified. However, the problems remain most registered voters were unaware of the process, the distance to the district headquarter is too long particularly for people living in the rural areas and the implicit

cost in applying for the replacement of voters card is high. These may discourage many of those who have lost their cards from reapplying for the new ones.

- **Pairing in Taking Photos**

The system of taking photos for voter's card was such that two people had to be taken their photos on a single film. This was a subject of complaint as an applicant had to wait for the second person to appear so that he/she could be taken a picture and register. In centres where few people were registered in a day applicant had to spent a lot of time waiting for a second person to take picture with. However, most applicants understood the problem after being explained by the AROs.

Objections

Underage

In the mainland objections for applicants to register were largely based on two factors namely underage and non-citizenship. In several places some under-age people attempted to register. However, in most cases they were caught by the Assistant Registration Officers as they failed to provide evidence of their age when they were requested to do so. In Ilala district for example, about 38 cases of underage were reported, 3 provided evidence which were accepted and 35 cases could not provide evidence to verify their age. In Tanga and Monduli districts the same problem was experienced. However, in Tanga district centre no. 004538 three underage were registered. This was possible because they gave a different date of birth. When the observer went to the school they were studying he found that the three applicants were all underage. It is not known whether or not the three registered students were objected when Provisional Voter's Register was displayed for inspection.

Non-citizens

With regard to non-citizenship this problem largely occurred in boarder regions such as Kigoma, Mtwara, Kagera etc. It also occurred in Dar-es-Salaam where people from variety of nationalities dwell. In Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara some applicants of Makonde ethnic groups were refused to register because either they participated in the Mozambican general elections or their citizen's status was disputed. This occurred in Buza B and Makumbusho area respectively.

In Handeni an Arab was refused to register he did not bother he just left the station. In Tanga Municipality, there were also some cases of non citizens attempting to register. In all those cases they were requested to provide proof of their citizenship, some of them provided while

others couldn't. Those who couldn't were issued with respective forms for them to appeal. Table 2 below shows the action taken by Assistant Registration Officers in handling no-citizens applicants. Complaints related to citizenship were observed in 54% of the centres monitored by TEMCO observers. In 53.7% out the 54% of centre observed non-citizens were not registered while in 0.3% of centres observed had registered non-citizens. One of the explanations for registering non-citizens was that applicants have been voting for many years and so the AROS were afraid to antagonize them.

Table 2: What Did Assistant Registration Officer Do to Non-Citizens

Decision	Number of Centres Observed	Percentage
Not Registered	338	53.7
Registered	2	0.3
No such Applicants	290	46.0
Total	630	100

System of Handling Complaints

The system of handling complaints and objections was generally impartial and efficient (see Table 3). Findings from TEMCO observers reports show that 52.7% of all complaints reported were handled with great impartiality and efficiency while 47.3 % of the reported complaints were handled efficiently. This is partly because (with the exception of few cases) of the severity of the punishment for ROs and AROs who messes up with elections. Also, lack of tense political competition between and among political parties and failure of opposition parties to place party agents in all registration centres has rendered the observation by party agents to be a CCM affair in most centres. All in all, findings from TEMCO observers' reports show that most objections made were genuine and were not biased by partisan inclinations.


Table 3: The Handling of Complains by Registration Officials

Handling of Complaints	Number of Centres with Complaints	Percentage
With great Impartiality and Efficiency	107	52.7
With Reasonable Impartiality and Efficiency	96	47.3
Partial and Inefficient	-	-
Total	203	100

Objections, Complaints from the Provisional Voters' Register

The Provisional Voters' Register was displayed for seven days in each registration zones as required by law. Voters inspected the register and raised several complaints and objections. Major complaints have been of data corrections including spelling mistakes and omissions of names. Such problems were expected as a minor mistake in shading could lead to such problems. In other constituencies such as Arusha municipality several people were missing from the PVR. In Arusha municipality alone about 732 registered voters' names were missing from the Provisional Voter's Register. Out of the 732 names, 394 were from Ngarenaro, 131 Elerai, 50 Sombetini, 18 Daraja Mbili and 50 Sokoni the remaining names were from several other areas in the Municipality. We hope all missing names would be included as the display of the PVR itself is meant to solve some of these problems.

Concerning objections related to the Provisional Voters' Register TEMCO has been able to access data of seven districts. These are Bunda, Mbozi, Tanadhimba, Masasi, and Mtwara rural districts and Sumbawanga and Lindi Urban districts. The pattern emerging from data from this districts shows that most people were objected on citizenship problem. About 84% of people objected, were for not being Tanzanian citizens. Data also shows that the death toll in Tanzania is very high. About 10.9% of the objected were reported to have died after registration process. About 4.8% of the objections were on the basis of age, unsound mind etc. Figure 1 shows the pattern of objections.



Conclusion

Generally speaking we can say that most complaints were handled efficiently and in accordance to the requirement of the law. Partisan influences were minimal if any. Some of the complaints aired could have been minimized if applicants were aware of the law governing registration. There is a need to increase efforts in providing voter education to enable voters understand issues regarding elections. There is also a need to review some of the clauses of the law as discussed above because such clauses provide a room for abuse. Also implicit costs involved in processing appeal particularly for people living far away from the district headquarter need to be taken into account in reviewing such clauses.

CHAPTER FOUR

VOTER EDUCATION AND RESPONSE

1.0 Contextual Framework

Voter education is a distinctive part of civic education. It is one of the most crucial requirements for the smooth running of elections, and it facilitates effectiveness and efficiency in the management of electoral processes including the voters' registration. The necessity of Voter Education (VE) rests on the premise that a politically competent and well informed citizenry is more likely to participate confidently, effectively and meaningfully in elections than one with scant information and inadequate competencies, particularly on the family of rules, regulations and procedures governing elections in a political system. Moreover, anecdotal evidence reveals a positive correlation between a conscious politically literate voter and the rate of response and participation in political events such as elections. The definitions of the concept 'voter education' are scarce in the books on politics. However, there is a consensus among politicians-cum- political activists and political scientists that VE denotes deliberately planned learning interventions and programmes aimed at disseminating relevant information to the public in general and particularly potential voters in order to enable them acquire useful knowledge, skills and attitudes required to enhance their political competency for active and effective participation in the electoral processes. Electoral processes include registration for voting, nomination of candidates, participating in campaigning, and voting on the Election Day.

Effective Voter Education cannot happen by chance, and it is too important to be left to everyone. It has to be formally organised and delivered professionally using appropriate adult learning approaches and techniques. Meaningful VE has to focus on the felt needs of the potential voters and should be aimed at filling the voters' knowledge gaps on the electoral processes. Useful VE must produce tangible results and led to desirable changes in voters' political behaviour. For instance, meaningful VE programme should enable participants become proactive voters who are well aware of their civic duties and obligations, including their right to participate in elections. It should produce legally competent voters with readiness to follow, to the letter, the rules, regulations and procedures governing elections. It should empower voters to be able to educate others on the rationale of elections as well as the 'dos and don'ts in elections. Experience shows that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been the major providers of Vein new democracies as well as in

countries in democratic transition including Tanzania (Kanyinga and Mogeni, 2005; Wanyande, 1998). The CSOs include including religious or Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), Community Based organizations (CBOs) and the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Governments (National Electoral Commissions, government owned media and government leaders) as well as political parties, by virtue of their conventional functions, also have the responsibility of providing VE to, respectively, the citizens and their members and supporters. Governments, CSOs, political parties, the media and promotional interest groups including religious organizations are key actors and agents of VE. They are all partners in driving the democratization process forward in a polity. This implies that VE is too important to be left to a single provider in a political system.

It is in the light of the foregoing that TEMCO in its endeavour to monitor the registration of voters for the 2005 general elections and the process of creating a Permanent Voters Register (PVR) set to observe the manner and the extent to which different agents of VE in the country played their part in facilitating VE for the purpose of preparing a fertile ground for the successful management of the 2005 general elections and the creation of a PVR in Tanzania.

The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it analyses the work and interventions of various VE providers before and during the voters' registration exercise in the four zones, including regions, districts and constituencies which were sampled out for TEMCO monitoring purposes. Second, in the light of the findings of in the TEMCO monitors' reports and empirical surveys, the paper makes an assessment of the level of people's awareness of the plethora of rules, regulations governing the processes of voters' registration and creation of a Permanent Voter Register. Third, it examines the voters' turn up trends in the areas sampled out for TEMCO monitoring in Tanzania mainland regions. For the purpose of this paper, voter education is narrowly defined. It denotes deliberate educational and learning initiatives or interventions specifically organized by different providers of VE for disseminating useful information on the registration of voters for the 2005 elections and creation of a PVR. The information include the reasons for registering in the PVR; benefits of PVR; when, where, and how to register; and the rules, regulations and procedures guiding the processes of registration and creation of a PVR.

2.0 Facilitators of Voter Education

The role of various actors in facilitating voter education was very crucial for the successful registration of voters. VE was even more important before and during the voters' registration stage in this election year than at any other time on the basis of the fact that, for the first time in the country's post-independence history, Tanzania government is creating a Permanent Voter Register. TEMCO monitors and the public in its entirety expected different actors in the country to organize a number of VE interventions using different strategies for the purpose of raising the political consciousness of the citizens to enable them turn up in big numbers for registration. To use Paul Freire's concept it was an opportune time for the providers of political and civic education in the country on the one hand to "conscientize" the potential voters on the relevance and benefits of registering themselves in the PVR and, on the other hand, to help them understand the do's and don'ts of the registration process for the purpose of enhancing voters' competencies in political participation. We now turn to the TEMCO monitors field observations and empirical findings on the role played by various agents in facilitating VE. We focus on each VE actor in turn.

2.1 The National Electoral Commission

The National Electoral Commission did the needful in different ways to educate the people and potential voters on various issues related to the creation of the PVR and the registration for 2005 elections. Reports by the TEMCO monitors reveal various strategies which NEC adopted to disseminate information on voters' registration. The commission organised seminars for leaders of political parties and government leaders at regional, district, ward and village levels in order to educate them on the voters' registration process's requirements, rules, regulations and procedures. For instance on March 23, 2005 NEC organized a seminar on PVR for political parties' leaders in the coast zone (Ndumbaro, 2005). The government officials, who participated in the seminars, were expected to disseminate useful information to potential voters in the areas under their jurisdiction. The leaders of political parties were expected to relay the same message to their members, activists, supporters and the public in its entirety.

A number of posters, brochures, pamphlets and fliers were designed and distributed throughout the country. These, by means of the written word and visual illustrations, carried out messages on the voters' registration exercise and the PVR. The monitors' reports indicate that these paper printed materials were spread in almost all accessible strategic

public places including bus stations/stands, health centres, schools, voters' registration centres, hotels and bars etc. This was, undoubtedly, a commendable effort by the body in-charge of managing elections in the country. However, the effectiveness of this strategy for conveying accurate and adequate information to all potential voters is questionable on the reason that the adult literacy (and visual literacy) rate in the country is considerably on the decline (Rubanza, 2005a; TEMCO, 2005). Moreover, regarding NEC's strategy of disseminating voters' registration information using the printed word and visual illustrations, the TEMCO regional coordinator observed that:

Much of these efforts were directed to make people to go to register rather than understanding rules, regulations, and process of registration including the display of the provision PVR and objection process. (Ndumbaro, 2005, p. 9).

This observation is too important to ignore for the purpose of attaining effective communication with the potential voters. However, despite this shortcoming, NEC did not rely on a single method to convey information pertaining to the voters' registration. The commission also used the local electronic and print media to convey educative messages on the PVR and registration exercise. These included the use of Radio, Television and Newspapers which, undoubtedly, conveyed the right PVR messages to NEC's target audience, the Tanzanian potential voters. In addition mobile vehicles mounted with public address systems and big loud speakers were driven throughout towns and their vicinity to inform and mobilise the people to register themselves in the PVR. This method was almost used in all urban and semi-urban areas.

The data obtained through the questionnaire administered by TEMCO monitors involving 1084 respondents in the monitored constituencies reveal that 267 respondents (about 27 percent) had heard information on the PVR directly or indirectly from NEC or its various communication channels and officials. Moreover, the survey reveals that 779 respondents (78.3 percent) who had information on the PVR obtained information from the media, and such information may have originated directly from the NEC. Moreover, TEMCO had 649 monitors participating in the monitoring of the processes of voters registration for the 2005 general elections and creation of the PVR. 597 monitors (92.3) show that there were indicators of VE provision in the areas they monitored (TEMCO, 2005). The NEC strategies, like any other communication strategy might have suffered from inherent shortcomings; however, the TEMCO monitors' observations, generally, commend the efforts made by NEC to spread information on the voters' registration exercise.

2.2 Government Officials

The only way in which government officials were involved in facilitating voters' education was organizing and addressing public meetings. In most cases these meetings had one specific agenda, which was to emancipate the potential voters to go out to register themselves in the PVR. Information on the rules, regulations and procedures governing the registration were, by and large, overlooked or given scant attention. Top government leaders including the President, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Regional and District Commissioners as well as Ward Executive Officers and Village Governments' Leaders were involved in addressing public rallies in which they strongly urged people to go out and register. Some of them spent reasonable time to explain the benefits of the government's decision to create a PVR. For instance, the TEMCO monitor reports that the Prime Minister made a one week tour (from 16-21 January, 2005) in Shinyanga region, and in one of his public meetings

He urged all government officials at all levels to leave their offices and go out in villages and educate/mobilise the poor peasants who were not aware about the importance of permanent voter registration process. He further advised all spiritual and various political leaders and those in respectable positions to join the campaign irrespective of their beliefs and politics. (Mutayoba, 2005a, p.8).

Whether the government officials heeded/complied with the Premier's directive or not is not the subject of this discussion. However, his directive demonstrates that the government had a duty of educating and emancipating the people to register for participation in the 2005 general elections. It is important to note that the Prime Minister's directive was more focused on mobilising people to turn up for registration rather than helping the potential voters understand the rules, regulations and procedures governing the registration process. Mobilization and emancipation were necessary voter educating approaches but insufficient strategies for facilitating desirable and adequate information required for effective participation in the registration process. It was, furthermore, observed that the government leaders' intervention was somewhat reactive rather than proactive as observed by the TEMCO regional coordinator in Tanga region, he observed that;

In the second week it seems the administration (NEC and government) was shocked by the low turn up. The Regional Commissioner made a tour throughout the region holding public rallies in which he called upon the people to come out for registration. In the same vein, Tanga Municipality organized a function in Mkwakwani stadium in which different theatre groups entertained people. In this function the only entry fee was to show one's Voter's certificate. This strategy did increase the rate of registration as this observer witnessed groups of people especially the youth joining the queues to get the certificates so that they could not miss the so-called "bongo flavour" and "Rusha roho." (Cleophae b, 2005, p.13)

The afore-cited observation shows that in some areas the government leaders' interventions occurred during the registration process not before. There is a possibility that some people were not adequately informed, mobilised and prepared by government leaders before the commencement of the registration process. The 'fire fighting' model by the government leaders for mobilization and sensitisation of voters was not an appropriate option for facilitating effective VE. The government and political leaders are very good at mounting mobilization and emancipation campaigns but these, as observed earlier may not be appropriate and effective methods for facilitating and acquisition of sustainable voting competencies. Meaningful VE and related learning packages must be careful and comprehensively designed and delivered appropriately in order to meet the identified needs of voters. A blanket approach to VE was not the best option. Despite this shortcoming The TEMCO survey which was carried out simultaneously with the PVR creation process reveals that 541 respondents (50.5 percent) got information on the PVR from various government leaders while 454 (42.4) respondents heard information on PVR from other sources, whereas 76 (7.1) respondents had no information at all on the register. Table 1.1 shows the respondent's specific government leadership sources of information

Table 1.1: Respondents Informed on PVR by Government Leaders

Level of Leadership	Frequency	Percentage
National Leaders: President, Premier and Ministers	36	6.1
Regional Leaders: RC and others	27	4.6
District Commissioner: DC and others	67	11.3
Local Members of Parliament	13	2.2
Division Secretary	4	0.7
Ward Executive Officer and others	66	11.1
Councillors	6	1.0
Village Leaders (village, hamlet, street)	368	62.2
Assistant Registration Officers	5	0.8
Total	592	100

Source: TEMCO- PVR Survey, 2005

The information in table 1.1 shows that government leaders at the grassroots played a pivotal role in disseminating information on voters' registration. On the basis of empirical data in Table 1.1, it seems the village and street leaders were the most useful and effective channel for communicating political information. Moreover, in the same vein, it seems plausible to suggest that any mobilization campaign strategy aimed at conveying political

information and VE in particular needs to involve government especially those at the district, ward and village/street levels.

Political Parties

One of the conventional functions of political parties is to facilitate political socialization through political education and communication programmes to their members and supporters. A political party, worth a name, must ensure that it has effective structures and strategies for delivering information to its members in order to prepare them for effective participation in political events including elections. There are currently sixteen fully registered political parties in Tanzania aiming to capture the state power through peaceful democratic means, i.e. contesting elections. They have a noble political obligation of preparing the electorate in its entirety to participate effectively in the electoral processes and consequently to cast their vote on the Election Day. Political parties are expected to mobilise their members and supporters to register for participating in elections as well as to educate them on the rules governing electoral competitions. Political parties are, therefore, key agents/actors of VE. However, the participation of political parties in the voters registration exercise leaves much to be desired. The findings of TEMCO monitors do not paint a good picture on political parties regarding their role of facilitating VE before and during the voters' registration process.

The TEMCO monitors observations show that only two political parties participated seriously in mobilising and emancipating their members and supporters to register in the PVR. These were Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF). CCM and CUF did their political education work (mobilization) in all regions which were observed by the monitors. Other political parties' participation, if any, in emancipating potential voters for registration was sporadic, patchy and absent as shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Political Parties Involved in Facilitating Voter Education

Zone	Region	Political Parties Involved in Facilitating VE
Lake	Kagera	CCM, CUF, TLP
	Mara	CCM, CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR- MAGEUZI, TLP
	Shinyanga	CCM, CUF, UDP
	Mwanza	CCM, CUF, CHADEMA
Central	Dodoma	CCM, CUF, CHADEMA
	Singida	CCM, CUF
	Tabora	CCM, CUF
	Kigoma	CCM, CUF, CHADEMA

Northern	Tanga	CCM, CUF
	Arusha	CCM, CUF
	Kilimanjaro	CCM, CUF, TLP, CHADEMA, DEMOKRASIA MAKINI
	Manyara	CCM, CUF
Coastal	Dar es Salaam	CCM, CUF
	Morogoro	CCM, CUF, CHADEMA
	Coast Region	CCM, CUF,

Source: TEMCO Regional Coordinators PRV Monitoring Reports

CHADEMA and TLP mobilised people for registration only in six and three regions respectively, whilst UDP and Demokrasia Makini emancipated potential voters for registration in one region only. Observations made by the TEMCO monitors on the participation of political parties in facilitating VE do not show a significant difference from the findings revealed by the TEMCO survey on the dissemination of information on the PVR to the public. The survey questionnaire administered by the monitors reveal that the number of respondents who heard information on the PVR from political parties was 632, of which 622 respondents (98.4 percent) identified specific political parties from which they heard information about the PVR. Table 1.3 shows the survey findings.

Table 1.3: Respondents Informed on PVR by Specific Political Parties

Political Party	Frequency	Percentage
CCM	340	54.7
CUF	175	28.1
CHADEMA	37	5.9
TLP	31	5.0
UDP	28	4.5
NCCR-MAGEUZI	6	1.0
CHAUSTA	3	0.5
DEMOKRASIA MAKINI	2	0.3
TOTAL	622	100

Source: TEMCO- PVR Survey, 2005.

Undoubtedly, only two political parties showed a reasonable level of seriousness in facilitating VE, at least, by the way of mobilizing people to register for voting in the 2005 elections and for the creation of a PVR. TEMCO monitors' reports indicate that CCM had special committees created specifically to mobilise potential voters to turn up for registration in the PVR. Additionally, both CCM and CUF in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam claimed that they used the "house-to-house" campaign model to persuade people to go out for registration (Ndumbaro, 2005; Rubanza, 2005b). Monitoring reports show that prior and during the voters registration phase, the CUF national chairperson addressed public rallies

in Kigoma, Tabora, Manyara, Kagera, Mara, Tanga, Dar es Salaam and Morogoro. In those rallies he specifically persuaded and mobilised people to turn up in big numbers for registration in the PVR. All political parties which played part in mobilising and sensitising the public on the PVR organised public rallies to convey the information. In such rallies insufficient information on the rules, regulations and procedures governing elections was disseminated to the audience.

Based on the survey data, with the exception of CHADEMA, TLP and UDP, it seems the participation of other political parties in disseminating the PVR related information to the public was, generally, insignificant. Seven political parties with full registration certificates were not heard conveying messages on PVR by the respondents in the survey. This trend shows the inherent weaknesses of most political parties in the country. Political parties have the duty of educating their members and supporters especially during the election season in order to create opportunities for maximising their votes in elections. They are key partners and in the Tanzania democratization process. On the basis the survey data, one wonders if, really, some of the political parties in Tanzania exist to perform the functions that conventional political parties do or have other non- political motives hence are merely interest groups *per excellence*. In such a situation most political parties are not serving a useful purpose in the endeavour to create a political competent citizenry as well as driving forward the democratization process in the country.

It was also observed that some leaders of political parties did not accord the exercise the deserving importance. The TEMCO observer reports that “even national leaders don’t treat this exercise with required seriousness and importance during their visits in the region” (Chogero, 2005, p. 9). Moreover, The TEMCO monitor for Hanang district noted that in one of the public rallies that was addressed by the CCM Central Committee member, Hon. F. Sumaye at Katesh Primary school ground, the largest part of the meeting was overshadowed more by dramatic reception of the ten NCCR-Mageuzi who had defected to CCM than dissemination of useful information on the PVR (Mkoka, 2005).

Civil Society Organizations

A recent study on the “Mapping of Civic and Voter Education Initiatives in Tanzania Mainland” shows that there are more than 75 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which ‘claim’ to have the role of providing Civic/Voter Educational programmes in Tanzania. Moreover, according to the study 54 CSOs participated in facilitating VE in the 2000

general elections (Ally, 2004, pp.5-6), and out of which 26 CSOs were funded by donors to provide VE for Tanzania 2000 elections (Kanyinga and Mogeni, 2005, p.4). This indicates that Tanzania has no shortage of CSOs or experiences required to provide effective voter educational programmes. Unfortunately, with the exception of religious organizations or Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) most of the CSOs did not participate at all in facilitating VE in the zones and regions monitored by TEMCO during the processes of voters' registration and creation of the PVR. The monitors' reports reveal that in isolated two occasions, only two CSOs attempted to provide VE. They are:

- Global Network of Religion for Children (GNRC): Organised a three-day workshop on "Empowering Religious Leaders for 2005 Elections". The seminar was attended by Religious leaders from Dar es Salaam region
- Agenda Participation 2000 – used media and posters to educate and mobilise people to go to register ((Ndumbaro, 2005, p. 9).

The non-participation and unnoticeable role of CSOs in the provision of VE is correctly reported by the regional TEMCO coordinator for Manyara region as follows:

The role of CSOs too has been insignificant. These "people based" organizations have not played their required civic role and obligation of telling, educating, and raising awareness of their members in areas of voter education and formation of this PVR in particular in Manyara region. This, I have noticed is due to the low capacity and ability of the leadership in the CSOs composed of NGOs, CBOs and FBOs. Many leaders in these organizations don't have the needed education level and capacity to pass this information to their members. (Chogero, 2005, P.9.)

Non-participation of CSOs in the provision of VE, to a certain extent, robbed the Tanzanian public the opportunity to learn and know more about the PVR. The main reason for the non-participation of these organizations was, arguably, that they had no specific funding for VE (TEMCO, 2005). Anecdotal evidence shows that almost all CSOs involved in the provision of civic education and voter education in particular, by and large, depend on donor money. This is not the best option to facilitating sustainable civic education programmes or ensuring the survival of CSOs. The CSOs need to find alternative ways of raising money for their political work from local sources. Over-dependence tendency on donor funding, in the long term, may have some adverse consequences for the smooth functioning of the CSOs.

TEMCO observations reveal that religious organizations, especially leaders of churches and mosques played a critical role in mobilizing their followers/believers to register in the PVR for the 2005 general elections. The messages on the PVR and the registration exercise were disseminated during the Fridays prayers by the Moslem leaders and on Saturdays/Sundays'

services or sermons by the Christians' leaders. The monitors observed that big numbers of potential voters turned up for registration immediately after the prayers. Most of the religious leaders urged their followers to understand that they had a moral obligation and duty to participate in electing political leaders for their country.

Fortunately, the non-participation of the biggest number of the CSOs in disseminating information on the voters' registration exercise did not hinder the Tanzanian people from getting information on the PVR. They TEMCO survey findings attest to this fact. One of the questionnaire items asked the respondents whether they have heard anything on the PVR or not. Their responses are presented in Table 1.4

Table 1.4: Respondents who have Heard Information on the PVR

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes, I have heard	998	92.2
No, I have not heard	73	6.8
Does not know or refused to answer	11	1.0
Total	1082	100.0

Source: TEMCO- PVR Survey, 2005.

Drawing and generalizing from the survey data, it seems most people were able to get information on the PVR from other channels of communication. The non-participation of the CSOs did not affect in any significant ways access to information on the PVR and voters registration for the 2005 general elections.

2.5 The Media

As usual, the media, in its entirety, was a useful channel for communicating messages on the voters' registration and creation of the PVR. The respondents in the TEMCO survey on the exercise were asked to name the specific channel of communication from which they obtained information on the PVR. The findings are presented in Table 1.5.

Table 1.5: Respondents' Specific Sources of Information on the PVR

Medium	Frequency	Percentage
Radio	730	58.6
Television	273	21.9
Newspapers	243	19.5
Total	1246	100.0

Source: TEMCO, PVR Survey, 2005

It seems the radio was the most effective communication channel for disseminating information to the people, consequently educating them on the PVR and registration exercise. This findings is echoed by the TEMCO monitor in Manyara region who observed that “In the rural areas the radio has been an effective tool of information dissemination and sent the NEC messages home to the target group” (Chogero, p. 8)

2.6 Consequences of Inadequate VE Interventions

Although the data gathered from TEMCO survey reveals that the majority (877) respondents (82.5 percent) were able to mention the benefits of the PVR, however, there were 186 respondents (17.5 percent) who did not know at all the benefits of the PVR. Drawing meaningful generalization from these findings, it seems there were a significant number of people in Tanzania who did not know the benefits of a PVR. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the monitors’ reports indicates that some of the people were ignorant on the purpose and benefits of the PVR, and they perceived the register in different misleading ways. There was also lack of understanding on the necessary conditions for registration. Unfounded rumours also surrounded the PVR. These indicators of ignorance are well documented in the TEMCO monitors’ reports, and some of these are worth noting

- The PVR is geared at facilitating the re-introduction of development levy and attaining efficiency in the collection of levy money (Mkinga, 2005).
- It aims at giving *bonafide* Tanzanian citizens a permanent citizenship identity card. Some equated the voters IDs to the citizenship or national IDs. This was identified as “a great pusher to registering” especially to the young people (Chogero, 2005, Ndumbaro, 2005). Moreover, the desire to have two identity cards, arguably, motivated people to go for a second registration, hence they did not have ill intentions including voting more than once (Cleophace , 2005a; Mkoka, 2005).
- That those failing to register could lose their business licences (Rubanza, 2005b, p.13).
- That money was required to pay for photographs (Mkinga, 2005,) and that a fee was required for registration in order the voter ID to be issued (Mutayoba, 2005).
- Voter IDs will enable people get treatment in hospitals, dispensaries and clinics (Mziray, 2005, p.7.).
- Some people were completely unaware of the fact that people reaching 18 years of age by October 2005 qualified to register. Students in five secondary schools and in several primary schools in Hanang district were ignorant of this fact Mkoka (2005, p.7).
- PVR was aimed at facilitating easy identification for those voting for the opposition political parties for the purpose of punishing them; The PVR was for CCM members only and not otherwise; and some voters registration centres were for CCM supporters and members only (Mutayoba, 2004, p.14
- The government wanted to downsize the population of the Maasai cows; and that
- After the elections the voters’ IDS will be taken back by the government (Mkinga, 2005, p.7).
- Some people below the statutory voting age (18 years) turned up for registration at almost all centres in Dar es Salaam region and other monitored areas; and

- Some people turned up for registration in their non-residential areas, and the procedures for changing cards for those who had registered elsewhere in the country were not known to most people (Ndumbaro, 2005 pp.10-11)

The aforementioned ignorance indicators could be partly and significantly attributed to inadequate voter education interventions.

3.0 People's Awareness

Most people were more aware of the registration dates and location of centres than the registration process, law, rules, and regulations guiding the creation of the PVR. As demonstrated in the preceding section, there was a significant number of isolated indicators and incidences which showed little or lack of awareness of the legal regime governing the voters' registration process. TEMCO monitors identified the indicators and incidences as follows:

- Under-age registration
- Double registration
- Eligibility for registration for those who would be 18 years old by October 2005.
- Time spent by the Assistant registration Officers to educate the registration applicants on the requirements and procedures for registration
- Unawareness of transferring registration if one changes place of residency.
- Unawareness of what one needs to do in case his/her voter ID got lost or misplaced.
- Unawareness of what to do in case one is refused registration and how to raise objections.
- Provisional registration list and what to do after it is produced and made public.
- Unawareness of acceptable appearance for photographing purposes in the voters' registration centres.

Despite the isolated incidences listed above, generally, most of the TEMCO monitors' responses reveal that the registered potential voters in the areas under their observations understood the registration laws and regulations. One of the questionnaire items in the instruments used by the monitors asked them whether or not the registered potential voters had an understanding of the law and regulations governing the registration process. Their responses are shown in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6: Registered Voters' Knowledge on Registration Law and Regulations

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes, they had an understanding	518	80.1
No, they did not have an understanding	5	0.8
Had no civic education	69	10.7
Interested in identity card only	14	2.1
A few knew but many did not	18	2.8
Had an average understanding	10	1.5

Many new but a few did not	8	1.2
Some knew but others did not	4	0.6
Some laws are not known	1	0.2
Total	647	100.0

Source: TEMCO, PVR Survey Data

In the light of the monitors assessment most registered potential voters had an understanding of the family of laws, rules and regulations governing the registration of voters and creation of a PVR. However, one wonders as to how the potential voters demonstrated high level of awareness in an environment of inadequate VE interventions, particularly by the CSOs which, in the Tanzanian context are mostly preferred (by donors?) for facilitating VE.

4.0 Voters Response

The voters turn up for registration in the PVR for 2005 general elections was excellent, and indeed impressive. In some regions and constituencies the turn up for registration exceeded the official NEC estimates. The voters' registration data in the zones to which TEMCO monitors were deployed for observing the creation of the PVR attests to the fact that the turn out rate was very high and, in some cases, extremely high as shown in the following Table.

Table 1.7: Registered Voters in TEMCO Monitored Areas

Source: Compiled from TEMCO Regional Coordinators' Monitoring Reports

As the statistical data shows in the TEMCO monitored areas, NEC estimated to register 7,062,536 potential voters in PVR, however, the number of the actual registered voters was 7,144,584 (101.16 percent). Thus, in these areas NEC's target was exceeded by 82,048 potential voters. We are, therefore, convinced to conclude that, in the areas that were monitored by TEMCO, the voters' response and turn up for registration exceeded expectations hence was very impressive. Moreover the overall registration trend in Tanzania mainland did not deviate much from the observations made in the TEMCO monitored areas. The data in Table 1.8 are instructive.

Table 1.8: Registered Voters by Region

No.	Region	Target	Registered	Percentage
1.	MTWARA	635,114	572,027	90.1
2.	LINDI	432,563	395,730	91.5
3.	IRINGA	744,322	670,547	90.0

4.	MBEYA	1,046,971	942,053	90.0
5.	RUKWA	471,787	437,833	92.9
6.	RUVUMA	576,730	505,512	87.0
7.	KIGOMA	658,418	595,074	90.38
8.	SINGIDA	524,838	474,603	90.43
9.	DODOMA	847,259	748,629	88.36
10.	TABORA	816,868	722,435	88.44
11.	MARA	636,463	681,981	108
12.	KAGERA	910,087	912,256	100.2
13.	SHINYANGA	1,288,164	1,243,157	97
14.	MWANZA	1,407,357	1,404,211	97.36
15.	ARUSHA	650,755	656,398	101
16.	TANGA	823,961	791,668	96
17.	KILIMANJARO	705,549	659,514	93
18.	MANYARA	501,516	483,083	96
19.	MOROGORO	921,217	897,347	97.0
20.	PWANI	466,797	456,781	98.0
21.	DAR ES SALAAM	1,503,494	1,691,983	113.0
	TOTAL	16,570,230	15,942,824	96.0

Source: National Electoral Commission, 2005

On the basis of the statistical information in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, it seems plausible to conclude that the turn up rate for registration was excellent, and hence the voter's response to register in the PVR and for the 2005 general elections was excellent, especially in the absence of a deliberate and coordinated comprehensive programme of Voter Education. We are also convinced to conclude that the work of NEC, government leaders at all levels, religious leaders and participating "serious" political parties as well as the media was very effective, at least, in mobilizing and emancipating potential voters to come out in big numbers for registration in the PVR. The work of these partners in democratization through elections should be commended, praised and really they deserve a credit. The big turn out rate also justifies the effectiveness of the public mobilization and sensitisation strategies and communication channels used by the participating institutions to reach the targeted audience. These include the use of media, religious leaders, NEC's paper printed materials (i.e. fliers/leaflets, posters, brochures) public meetings/rallies, etc. It seems these strategies worked well in delivering the right message to the right audience at the right time and for the right course. These strategies in the Tanzanian context seem to be the "best practices" for mobilising potential voters and participation in politics in general.

4.1 Voters Response by Gender

Gender mainstreaming is almost a catching phrase, and a critical area of focus in countries which are in democratic transition including Tanzania. Undoubtedly, the gender conscious

individuals may be interested to know the turn up trends or rates across the gender variable. Some of the TEMCO monitors, in the course of executing their duties, managed to capture the statistical data on this dimension. Their findings are presented in Table 1.9

Table 1.9: Potential Voters' Turn up Across Gender in Specific Monitored Areas

Region	Constituency	Male	Female	Total	Percentage
KAGERA	Bukoba	54,694	62,509	117,203	55.3
	Nkenge	39,949	38,908	78,857	49.3
	Biharamulo East	57,877	60,528	118,405	51.1
	Biharamulo West	36,235	38,778	75,013	51.7
MWANZA	Buchosa	61,536	56,576	118,112	47.9
	Sengerema	52,875	58,899	111,774	52.7
DAR ES SALAAM	Ilala	47,689	35,770	83,459	42.8
	Ukonga	185,865	171,166	357,031	47.9
	Temeke	153,222	137,274	290,496	47.2
	Kigamboni	116,020	109,758	225,778	48.6
	Kinondoni	126,943	112,800	239,743	47.0
	Ubungo	166,846	138,462	315,308	43.9
	Kawe	97,273	82,924	180,197	46.0
TANGA	Tanga Municipal	67,961	67,749	135,710	50.1
	Handeni	57,367	59,657	117,024	50.9
	Kilindi	31,747	33,153	64,900	51.0
	Korogwe Urban	14,657	15,195	29,852	50.9
	Korogwe Rural	46,035	50,830	96,865	52.5
KILIMANJARO	Moshi Urban	40,463	43,010	83,473	51.5
	Moshi Rural	92,410	98,917	191,327	51.7
	Same	46,926	51,506	98,432	52.3
TABORA	Igunga	67,052	70,370	137,422	51.2
	Igalula	26,208	22,592	48,800	46.3
	Tabora North	35,512	34,873	70,385	49.5
	Sikonge	29,672	29,351	59,023	49.7
	Tabora Urban	44,113	44,502	88,615	50.2
	Urambo West	37,115	34,982	72,097	48.5
	Urambo East	32,643	31,615	64,258	49.2
	Nzega	53,383	51,487	104,870	49.0
MARA	Bukene	37,867	38,883	76,750	50.7
	Rorya	51,071	62,082	113,153	54.9
	Tarime	60,988	70,835	131,823	53.7
	Bunda	35,541	41,487	77,028	53.8
	Mwibara	22,179	22,502	44,681	50.4
	Total	2,127,934	2,079,930	4,217,864	49.3

Source: Compiled from TEMCO Regional Coordinators' Monitoring Reports, 2005

The voters' registration in the constituencies in which the monitors were able to collect the data across gender show that significant potential women voters were registered. This, partly, shows that the level of political consciousness among women in Tanzania is

growing, if we are to use and rely on the turn up rate for registration criterion. This is a positive step towards achieving desired political emancipation and participation among women.

One of the voters registration monitoring instruments used by the TEMCO monitors required them to assess the extent to which the potential voters were excited to go out for registration in the PVR. Their findings are presented in the following Table:

Table 1.10: Monitors’ assessment of Potential Voters’ Excitement Levels

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Great excitement	468	72.7
Moderated		
Seemed like being forced	4	0.6
Total	644	100.0

Source: TEMCO, PVR Survey, 2005.

On the basis of quantitative information in Table 1.10 and observations made by the TEMCO monitors, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that the potential voters turned up for registration was absolutely voluntarily. The potential voters were too excited to participate in the registration exercise. They were extremely eager to have their names enrolled in the PVR. The monitors’ reports do not show any incidence in which potential voters were conditioned or forced to go out for registration. The factors which explain the high level of response (turn up) and great excitements are many depending on the individual’s judgement. However, the following may have contributed significantly to the high turn up rate and excitements among the potential voters:

- Some of the people equated the Voter ID to either a passport or a National Identity Card. This may have been a push factor.
- The mobilization strategies and channels of communication employed by various players/stakeholders especially NEC were very effective tools for disseminating information.
- Improvements in the NEC’s competences and capacity for the effective management of the electoral processes, in this case the registration and creation of PVR processes. Useful lessons have been learnt from the past experiences, mistakes have been corrected within the NEC machinery and structures.
- Adequate time was provided for the exercise. The zone-after-zone model to voters’ registration exercise was appropriate and really a strong push factor, and worked well.
- The political consciousness and civic competency of the Tanzanians is considerably increasing. The desire to participate in politics is growing. There is an incipient

movement from parochial and subjective political behaviours into a participatory political culture.

- The political emancipation and mobilization work done by the serious political parties in the election competition particularly CCM and CUF played a very important role.
- The role of FBOs including the leaders of mosques and churches was instrumental in mobilization.

Lessons of Experience and Conclusion

More success stories than failure stories on the voters registration exercise in Tanzania have been told, heard and illustrated. However there are lessons that the exercise has generated which deserve attention.

- Although religious organizations are usually urged to stay away from politics, however, their involvement in mobilising potential voters for registration should not be underestimated. Religious leaders proved that they are important stakeholders in the election processes.
- Political rallies and public meetings are useful *fora* for disseminating politically-relevant information and are a critical mobilization tools. However, they are weak in providing sufficient information especially on laws, rules, regulations and procedures governing electoral processes in their entirety.
- CSOs have been and are conceived to be useful providers of Civic Education and Voter Education in new democracies including Tanzania. The recent past Tanzanian experience shows that their non-participation in preparing the potential voters for registration had no any effect on the turn up rate for registration. Moreover, over dependency on donor funding is not an appropriate option for sustainable development of the CSOs. The modus operandi of the CSOs in Tanzania calls for a reform programme.
- Voter Education programmes should not be designed and delivered during elections seasons only. The learning packages for VE should be part and parcel of Civic Education programmes offered on continuous bases. VE may be facilitated in different educational institutions and adult learning settings, if any.
- We have information from authoritative sources that today NEC has a legal mandate to facilitate VE. We suggest that NEC strive to design a comprehensive and well coordinated programme of VE that will take on board other key providers, i.e. the media, CSOs and religious leaders.
- Illiteracy is now becoming a national problem. It has risen from about 20 percent in the 1980s to around 40 percent at present. Fortunately, this undesirable factor did not directly hinder the potential voters from getting information on the PVR and voters registration exercise for the 2005 general elections. However, this should not be taken for granted; illiteracy may impede other electoral processes.
- The voters' registration and the creation of the PVR processes have generated success stories regarding the management of the first and foremost stage in an election. The challenge facing the NEC and other principle actors is to ensure that registered voters turn out, in big numbers, to vote on 30th October 2005 as they did at the registration stage. The permanent Voter ID was an incentive for registration, what incentives will the partners in democratization by elections offer to the voters on the voting day?

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

TEMCO NEWSLETTER

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PREPARATION OF THE PERMANENT VOTER REGISTER

MAINLAND UPDATE – CENTRAL ZONE

CONTENTS

	Page
1. WHAT IS TEMCO?	1
2. WHAT IS PVR?	1
3. IMPRESSIVE REGISTRATION	3
• Women Shine	3
• The Disabled Assisted	4
• Targets Achieved	5
4. THIN OPPOSITION PRESENCE	6
5. MAJOR LESSONS	7
• Management of Cameras	7
• Adequacy of Registration Centres	7
• Foreigners in Boarder Regions	8
• Attraction of the Voter's Card	9
• Influences of Culture and Religion	11
• Peace Without Police	12

1. WHAT IS TEMCO?

The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee [TEMCO] is a voluntary, non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit organisation founded in April 1994 by 24 non-governmental organisations in order to monitor and observe the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania. TEMCO's membership continued to grow, reaching 60 member organisations when it monitored the 2000 General Elections. TEMCO also monitored the May 2003 by-elections in Pemba's 17 constituencies and on Mainland's 4 constituencies.

Now TEMCO is engaged in monitoring preparation of the permanent voter register (PVR) by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) on the Mainland and Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) in Zanzibar. TEMCO will publish two monthly issues of its newsletter, one on Zanzibar and the other on the Mainland, so as to UPDATE the public on this important exercise. This issue concerns the Central Zone of the Mainland which consist of Dodoma, Singida, Tabora and Kigoma Regions.

2. WHAT IS PERMENT VOTER REGISTER?

An electoral register is a record of those who have the right to vote by virtue of "belonging" to an organisation, a group, community or nation. The record may be written or unwritten, i.e. depending purely on memory and "recognition" by fellow members. within this definition, the first division is between written and unwritten registers.

Unwritten registers, based on recognition of those who "belong" by memory, were used in many traditional communities before the art of writing became common here in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Now written registers are used in most countries for nation-level, provincial and district – level elections. However, the majority of elections in small organisations, groups and local communities across the world are still based on the principle of being "recognised" or "identified" by fellow members.

Written registers are in turn divided into two types: those which are election-specific and those which are permanent. Election-specific voter register is a record of all those who qualify to participate in a particular election; and that record cannot be used for other elections. So you have to register people anew in every election. A permanent voter register also records all those who qualify now for an election but gives room for updating that record so as to include those who will qualify and delete those in the record who will be disqualified in the future. So you update the PVR as a permanent, on-going exercise. Advantages of the PVR are given in box 1.

Box 1: advantages of the PVR (Permanent Voter Register)

- Reduces registration costs because updating costs are in the long run lower than registering all voters afresh for every election. High costs are only at the PVR preparation stage.
- People register themselves at leisure in the updating process
- The PVR can reduce election irregularities (e.g. double registration/voting) thereby building people's confidence in the electoral process.

The extent to which these and other advantages of the PVR are realised depends on how well it is prepared and handled, and all Tanzanians have a role in this.

The permanent voter register has a legal basis. It is being established by the authority of section 5 (3) (a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which directs the Parliament to establish a PVR through a law which spells out the details of its functioning. This is achieved by Section 12 of the Elections Act. No. 1 of 1985. Box 2 presents the essential details of that section.

Box 2: The Legal Basis of Tanzania's PVR-Elections Act No. 1, 1985, Section 12

- (1) Subject to this section, there shall for the purposes of this Act, be a permanent national voter's register for the United Republic which shall be in such parts, chapters or other divisions as the Commission shall determine.
- (2) Every Returning Officer shall make and maintain a register of voters for each and every polling district.
- (3) Every register of voters shall consist of names of all persons who are registered as voters in the polling district.
- (4) The register shall show, relative to every registered voter, the number of certificate of registration issued to such voter, the sex of the voter and the address at which the voter ordinarily resides and such other particulars as the Commission may direct.
- (5) Every register of voters for each polling district shall be a part of the permanent national voter register and its contents shall be communicated to the Director of Elections, and be kept and maintained in such manner as the Director of Elections may from time to time direct.
- (6) The Commission shall make regulations prescribing anything which is to be prescribed or directing any other matter to be done by any person for the purpose of giving full effect to the provisions of this section and establishing, keeping and maintaining the Permanent National Voters Register.

3. IMPRESSIVE OVERALL REGISTRATION IN CENTRAL ZONE

Women Shine

Contrary to the wrong belief that the place of the woman is the kitchen, women shone in registration as data reported by TEMCO monitors show. For example, in Manyoni district women account for 53% of all the registrees; in Nzega district they account for 51%; in Urambo East and Urambo West constituencies they account for 49% and 48%, respectively. Women have maintained a high registration record in all elections both before and after the introduction of the multiparty system.

This is impressive considering the fact that women in rural Tanzania are responsible for most production activities and general family upkeep. Contrary to this equality in registration, women have a smaller proportion when it comes to candidature for council and parliamentary elections, as was the case in the 1994 Local Government Elections, 1995 General Elections and 2000 Parliamentary, Presidential and Local Government Elections.

The disabled are Assisted

Apart from a few places where distances to registration centres were long, most centres had no obstacles to disabled people. Distances were reasonable, and most disabled people were accompanied by relatives or friends who gave them assistance, including carrying those with walking disability on bicycles.

In most registration centres observed by TEMCO disabled people were given first priority when they appeared at the centre. TEMCO Monitor for Dodoma Urban District describes how registration officials treated a lame person at the Majengo market centre which was placed upstairs:

“... when a lame person came with a wheel chair at the registration centre, the officials lifted him into the room, seated him on a chair, registered him, and carried him back to his wheel chair outside the room”.

The Dodoma Monitor entertained a suspicion that the blind people’s response may have been lower than that of other categories of disabled people. His report reads, in part:

“Dodoma is generously rich with blind people. Yet I could not find one coming to register at my two centres. I also visited eleven other centres in the town, but could find no one coming to register”.

The blind and the deaf could not benefit directly from the information tools used by NEC and political parties. Their main sources of information about the registration exercise were friends and relatives. Thus reports the Singida District Monitor:

“ The registration information from different sources was not accessible to people with disability such as the deaf and the blind. For example, the deaf were unable to participate in the public meetings because they could not hear, and the blind could not see the posters and other physical advertisements concerning the PVR exercise. The disabled people we interviewed said they got information through friends and relatives. Others said they got information from their churches or mosques”.

Registration targets achieved

Data submitted by TEMCO show that registration targets were achieved to the tune of 73 – 100%. This is not a mean achievement considering the many odds in rural Tanzania ranging from technical to socio-cultural impediments. The registration data for nine constituencies is given in box 3.

Box 3: Percent Registration in TEMCO-monitored Areas of the Central Zone		
Constituency	Estimated eligible voters	Actually registered
		Percent registration (%)
Kibakwe		61,077
		56,997
	93.3%	
Mpwapa		63,668
		58,137
	91.3%	
Urambo East		87,980
		64,258
	73.0%	

Urambo West		80,242
	90.3%	72,504
Dodoma Urban (District)		185,050
	88.5%	155,042
Chilonwa		62,000
	84.5%	52,355
Mtera		74,291
	89.2%	66,291
Nzega (district)		179,264
	101.2%	181,620
Singida (District)		147,855
	101.0%	148,670

4. THIN PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

In all the constituencies/districts monitored by TEMCO, presence of opposition parties in the registration process is reported to have been very thin. On the other hand, the ruling CCM is reported to have demonstrated strong presence. Parties were particularly expected to make a contribution to two activities of the registration process, namely voter education and monitoring of the registration centres. Through participation in the voter education process, parties mobilise and encourage their supporters to turn up for registration. This is the first secret in winning an election, because party supporters cannot vote unless they are registered. Party monitoring of registration centres helps to check unlawful registration, such as registration of underage people, non-residents and foreigners, as well as to ensure that party supporters are not refused registration unlawfully. Parties should have considered registration centre monitoring to be very important because in the last two general elections (1995, 2000) there were many allegations of unlawful registration. In all the districts monitored by TEMCO in the Central Zone, CCM gave voter education to its members and had an agent at all the registration centres. CUF was active in these districts but to a lesser scale than CCM. The other parties were encountered rarely in mobilisation meetings but hardly at the registration centres.

The main reason for the difference seems to lie in resource endowments. Whereas CCM was able to pay its registration observers (agents) shs. 500 per day, agents of opposition parties did not have such an allowance. CCM also had organisational advantage. Cell leaders of CCM who are found everywhere did the mobilising work for their party. CCM also has facilities such as offices, vehicles, etc. which most of the opposition parties lack. The TEMCO Monitor for Mpwapwa District reports the CCM dominance as follows:

“The political climate in the district and the two constituencies in particular is dominated by the ruling CCM. CCM has party branches in the entire district backed by party cell leaders everywhere. Thus CCM managed to place party agents in every registration centre. Current members of Parliament for Mpwapwa and Kibakwe constituencies belong to CCM which also has offices and vehicles which facilitate voter mobilisation and monitoring of the PVR process. On the other hand, opposition parties with a presence in the district include NCCR-Mageuzi, CUF, TADEA, CHADEMA and UDP. At the district level, only CUF has managed to establish an office at Mpwapwa township (Kikombo Road) and is active in Berege Ward. NCCR-Mageuzi has significant presence in Kibakwe Ward; but TADEA, UDP and CHADEMA have not established themselves formally in physical offices in these constituencies. The subsidies they are complaining about could probably help them to get established”.

5. MAJOR LESSONS

The following lessons should be learnt so as to improve performance in the remaining zones.

Management of cameras

In a number of centres registration was interrupted by camera-related shortages such as films, batteries and photo fix. The Monitor for Dodoma Rural district reports that some camera operators were incompetent: “Some of the camera operators were not competent enough and some photos were of inferior quality”. Similarly, the Kasulu district Monitor reports that some camera operators did not know enough English to be able to follow the instructions in the manual on how to operate the camera. So there were registration disruptions of one or several days due to camera defects.

In all the districts monitored there seemed to be only one roving camera repair technician based at the district headquarters. He could not cope with the work of repairing or replacing defective cameras in distant rural centres. Thus, for example, at Mang’onyi and Dung’unyi Irisiya centres in Singida Rural cameras were out of order for three consecutive days (12th – 14th December 2004) before being fixed by the one standby camera technician based in Singida Town.

Adequacy of Registration Centres

Adequacy of registration centres differed according to population density and availability of government buildings (as per law). Crowding was noted in high-density areas. On the other hand rural villages which had only one government or community building (e.g. school) had a shortage of centres and people had to travel several kilometres to register themselves.

In Manyoni District average distances were 2 – 3 km. However, for some villages (e.g. Kishangu, Mabondeni, Aghondi, Njiri, etc) people traversed six or more kilometres to register themselves. Distances in some parts of Singida Rural were 6 – 8 kilometres. Such big distances came about due to the principle that villages with very sparse population should be allocated only one centre so as to save on manpower and other resources. This was a disadvantage to those with walking disability.

Limited registration centres and distances may have lowered expected registration levels in some places. For example, Chinangali 2 village in Chilonwa constituency (Dodoma Rural) had an estimated 2,400 eligible voters,

but had only one registration centre (due to shortage of public buildings). Only 1100 (45.8%) were registered during the entire period of 21 days (average of 52 people per day).

In most constituencies the norm of 500 people per registration centre was not kept. For example, the number of people being served by each centre were as follows in four monitored constituencies: Urambo West, 603 people per centre; Urambo East (765); Singida South (662) and Singida North (870).

Foreigners in Border Regions

Non-residents who could be identified as Tanzanians, such as railway workers, post office workers, and others were granted registration on condition that they report to concerned district offices when they leave the district to go to their places of permanent residence. However, some non-residents may be foreigners. The monitor for Urambo District reports on the problem of detecting foreigners who are intent on registering:

“In relation to non-residents, I have a feeling that we might have registered non-citizens. For example, on 16/12/2004 at Tarafani registration centre, came a man who lied about his name, but CCM agents knew that the man was Tutsi who lives in a nearby refugee camp... After being refused registration, he left without complaining. Were it not for the lucky detection, he could have been registered... The problem is that these people are black, and they speak very good Swahili, making it difficult to doubt them”.

The Monitor for Nzega filed a similar story:

“Here in Nzega there are many people doing business at the market and claiming to be Waha from Kigoma. But many are known to be Hutus and Tutsis from Burundi. They are black in colour and speak Kiswahili like everybody else. So how do you recognize them if and when they come to the registration centre?”

The problem requires cooperation of the people, the political parties and the registration officials.

Attraction of the Voter’s Card

High turn out is partly explainable in terms of the attraction of the voter’s card. The card, with an attractive laminated photo, is not only valued as an entitlement to vote but also (probably much more) as a multipurpose identity. Brief quotations from the TEMCO Monitors’ Reports will elucidate the potential implications of the attraction of the voter’s card.

From Dodoma TEMCO Regional Coordinator

“The single most enticing factor was the provision of cost free identity cards. Everybody was excited about getting a free identity card which they proudly displayed”

From Singida TEMCO District Monitor

“High turn out was said to be a result of voters’ interest in the free ID cards and photos. They would use the voter’s card as a multipurpose ID”.

From Singida TEMCO Regional Coordinator

“Some groups of youths at Ukombozi centre were heard as saying that the voter’s cards were going to help them in getting licences for opening petty business in Singida town and elsewhere in the Region ... They regarded these cards as the much-talked-about National Identity Cards (NID) which may help them in future in case they wanted to travel or introduce themselves to others as true citizens of this country”.

In some places double registration was attributed to the attraction of the card rather than to an intention to vote twice in an election. In one case the culprit wanted a better photo. In another case the culprit wanted to guard against the loss of the cherished ID.

From Urambo TEMCO District Monitor:

“... a certain man came looking for help because his son had registered twice... For the first registration the photograph on the card was not good, so he decided to go to another centre where he got another ID with a nice photograph...”.

From Tabora TEMCO Regional Coordinator:

“In Nzega, a certain person named James Mala Jame registered himself at Nzega Ndogo centre and later registered himself again at Nzega Primary School centre within the same ward. This time his name was reversed to Jame Mala James. A ward-based ARO discovered this and got the man arrested by police. Asked why he did this, he said he wanted to ensure that one card would remain for voting purposes if one got lost” (our emphasis).

There were three such episodes in Nzega and in one case the culprit has already received a prison sentence of one year.

The use of the voter’s card as a multipurpose ID may increase the rate of losing it because it will be carried everywhere.

From Singida TEMCO District Monitor:

“In Singida district more than twenty people reported the loss of their voting cards within only two weeks of their registration. According to one Assistant Registration Officer we interviewed, many people have lost their certificates in local bars due to excessive drinking and a few of them during farming activities. They walk and travel with their cards everywhere as they are using them as identity cards for all sorts of purposes”.

Influences of Culture and Religion

Religio-cultural factors have exerted some negative influences on the registration exercise in some rural villages. Examples from Nzega, Kigoma North and Singida Rural illustrate this. Thus reports the Nzega District Monitor:

“Here in Nzega there were two incidences of Muslim women who refused to uncover their faces by removing the Hijab (veil) so as to have their faces photographed. They refused to comply saying that only their husbands were allowed to see their faces, and then they left the registration centre without registering and without complaining”.

The story of hijab is also highlighted in Kigoma North Monitor's report. Some Muslim women are reported to have objected to the removal of the hijab to expose their faces to photographers. However, the problem was solved through patient explaining by registration officials and CUF agents who were dominant in this area (followed by those of CCM and CHADEMA).

In Itanka Village (Ilongero Division, Singida Rural) about 70 people are reported to have refrained from registration because of their religious beliefs: "They claimed that to be photographed was a sin". Some Seventh Day Adventists in Nzega are also reported to have abstained because they believed the idea of voting is repugnant to God ("kupiga kura hakumpendezi Mungu").

Peace without Police

A noteworthy observation by all the reports from the Central Zone was the presence of peace in all the registration centres observed despite the fact that there were neither policemen nor militiamen in sight. Ponder on this!

Appendix 2

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PREPARATION OF THE PERMANENT VOTER REGISTER

MAINLAND UPDATE – LAKE ZONE

CONTENTS

	Page
1. THE LAKE ZONE	2
2. ON THE SUCCESS SIDE	2
• Peace Reigns	2
• Targets Achieved	2
• Limited Complaints	2
3. ON THE PROBLEM SIDE	3
• Cameras and their Operators	3
• Problems in Distribution of Registration Materials	3
• Inadequate Registration Centres	4
• Careless Mistakes	4
• Thin Presence of Opposition Parties	4
4. MAJOR LESSONS	5

1. THE LAKE ZONE

The Lake Zone consists of four regions, namely Shinyanga, Mwanza, Mara and Kagera. TEMCO sampled two or more districts from each of these regions: Shinyanga and Kahama districts in Shinyanga Region; Mwanza Urban, Mwanza Rural, Sengerema and Bariadi districts in Mwanza Region; Bunda and Tarime districts in Mara Region, and Bukoba Urban, Bukoba Rural and Biharamulo districts in Kagera Region. In each of these districts, two rural constituencies and an urban constituency were monitored. The major findings of this monitoring exercise are reported in this newsletter.

2. ON THE SUCCESS SIDE

The voter registration exercise in the Lake Zone had a number of successes. We report the main ones below.

Peace Reigns

The voter registration exercise in the Lake Zone was conducted in a peaceful environment in all the areas monitored by TEMCO. The registration officials are free to call in police or militia in the event of disturbances, but there were very few incidences which required police or militia intervention.

Targets Achieved

Over 90% registration was achieved in many places, thanks to the good mobilisation work by NEC, regional and district authorities, political parties, churches and mosques. In most areas observed by TEMCO the people (both men and women) were aware of the voter registration exercise and its importance, and were therefore ready to give it priority over other engagements.

The registration officials should also be congratulated for taking their work seriously. Average time used to get a voter registered was about 7 – 12 minutes after the first week which was slower. This shows great effort by the registration officials considering that they had only two days training, or one day training in the case of the camera operators.

Limited Complaints

There were very limited complaints about the conduct of the exercise either by the registrees, political parties or other stakeholders. This was a result of good monitoring of the exercise by party agents (especially CCM agents who were found everywhere) and NEC officials.

NEC personnel based at the ward level visited most centres regularly advising and taking stock of materials. In many places they were able to correct problems such as those related to the filling of the OMR form and the taking of finger prints.

On the whole, most registration officials were sensitive to people with disability, giving them priority whenever they appeared at the registration centre. In most stations priority was given to the disabled, the aged, women with small children on their backs, and expectant mothers.

3. ON THE PROBLEM SIDE

The following are some of the main problems observed in the Lake Zone.

Cameras and their operators

About 30% of the cases of interruptions of the registration exercise was attributed to problems related to the cameras and their operators. In some cases the operators did not have enough knowledge to operate the Polaroid cameras and in others the cameras were defective. In many cases the defects related to either lack of, or inadequate servicing of the cameras which had been used in other zones.

In all the constituencies monitored by TEMCO such problems led to interruption of the registration process for a number of hours and in a few cases for a full day before a solution was found. Incompetence of some operators and defective cameras led to pictures which are either too black or too faint to be scanned. So voters were sometimes compelled to take pictures twice or thrice in order to get acceptable products.

There was a lot of wastages of photo materials during the first week of the registration process in every district. Things improved in the second and third weeks. In Kahama, the assistant registration officers were instructed by district registration authorities to cancel the substandard pictures affixed on the registration forms No. 1 and to re-issue new ones after taking new acceptable pictures. A substantial number of camera operators in Kahama and Bariadi districts are reported to have encountered problems with their cameras.

Problems in Distribution of Registration Materials

About 50% of reported cases of interruptions of the registration process has been attributed to inadequate supply of registration materials to some centres. This seems to occur under three circumstances. First, where census figures have been outdated by population movements. This leads to oversupply or undersupply of registration materials.

Second, in some places NEC figures were different from those of the district or region which had taken account of population changes in different areas. For example, projection by NEC for Nyamagana and Ilemela constituencies was put at a total of 264,000 eligible voters, whereas the projection by the regional administration (which was clearly more accurate) was 305,000 people. Hence, the shortages experienced by a number of registration centres in these two constituencies.

The third reason is just a result of careless packaging of the materials, leading to oversupply of certain things and undersupply of others. Reported cases of missing materials include items such as form No. 1, forms No. 5A and 5B, glue stick, wizard glue, photo phix, lamination pouches, films, envelopes Nos 8 and 9, pens, ink, etc.

Interruptions due to shortage of materials range from several hours to two days. For example, at Gedeli, Zahanati and Kirumba A registration centres in Ilemela constituency (Mwanza region), shortages led to a stand still on January 22nd and 23rd 2005 until the City Director acted to rescue the situation. Some centres in the constituency had closed before 6.00 pm due to lack of registration materials.

Inadequate Registration Centres

Ideally, registration centres should be within walking distance from each other – and in many places this is the case, especially in urban areas. For example, in urban Shinyanga and Kahama distances between centres are 1.5 Kms which is “friendly” enough to the elderly and disabled. But in many rural areas of Shinyanga Region the centres were positioned at an average of 5 – 9 Kms. The reason for this is the limited number of government buildings available. All government and community buildings were used, including schools, local government buildings, teachers’ resources centres, court buildings, market buildings, cooperative society buildings, etc. Problems came where these buildings were absent or inadequate.

The Bunda District monitor reports that there was no registration centre at Nyamguma Islands due to the policy that only government buildings should be used. Thus on January 23rd 2005 some people hired a boat to take them to a centre on the mainland. The boat, which had a capacity to carry only 20 passengers, carried 30 people who were anxious to register that day. Unfortunately the overpacked boat capsized killing 11 people. The people on the Islands blamed the government saying that the accident occurred because there were no registration centres on the Islands.

There were also similar complaints in Mwibara constituency. Two Islands in that constituency did not have registration centres. People had to travel long distances – up to 7 kms to register either at Kibara cluster or Kibara Chekechea centres on the mainland.

Careless Mistakes

In some places assistant registration officers made expensive mistakes. For example, in Bunda District over 250 people who registered had to be recalled to repeat registration because they had not followed the NEC instructions on affixing the thumb print on their registration forms. Apparently, the assistant registration officer had not given proper instructions to these registrees. Visits of the ward registration officers were instrumental in discovering this mistake. They ordered a repeat registration for all the 250 voters.

We are not sure whether all affected by this mistake were able to get the word and to repeat the process. Those who will not have their cards corrected will face disqualification in October, 2005 when they submit faulty cards to presiding officers in the general elections.

Thin Presence of Opposition Parties

All political parties have an interest in the registration process, and many of them did try to mobilise their supporters to register themselves. Several of them also did monitor some registration centres to ensure a fair deal for their members and compliance with the registration rules.

However, out of the 15 opposition parties currently in the books, only five or so mounted rallies to mobilise their members to register or posted agents to monitor some registration centres. These were CUF, NCCR-Mageuzi, CHADEMA, UDP and TLP. In contrast, CCM used its elaborate cell system to mobilise its members and placed agents at all registration centres monitored by TEMCO.

Opposition parties had strong presence only in areas which they had won or done well in the 2000 general elections. Thus CUF had a strong presence in Bukoba Urban, some parts Mwanza and Bunda; TLP had a strong presence in Mwibara constituency and some part of Bukoba rural; UDP had strong presence in Bariadi, while CHADEMA had selective presence scattered in the entire zone. Most opposition parties are constrained by human, financial and institutional resources which they lack.

4. MAJOR LESSONS

The following lessons should be kept in mind so as to improve performance in the remaining zones:

- Assistant Registration Officers (AROs) should be cautioned to avoid expensive mistakes which may end up punishing the voters.
- Although religious organisations have been encouraged to steer out of politics, experience has shown that churches and mosques can also do a good job in mobilising people to go to register. Religious leaders played a very big role in voter education. Churches and Mosques included a message on the PVR (permanent voter register) in every sermon. They may have done as much work as that of the leaders of political parties. It is worth looking at this role positively.
- The non-participation or weak participation of secular NGOs/CSOs in the voter education for PVR has a lesson also. This is a result of external dependency for funding. Even those NGOs/CSOs which have ongoing activities in the Lake Zone did not contribute much to the voter mobilisation work arguing that they did not have specific funding for it.
- Finally, illiteracy did reduce the effectiveness of the voter education mounted by NEC. In Bunda and Mwibara constituencies, for example, many people said they were not able to get the message on the posters and fliers because they could not read. Illiteracy is now becoming a national problem: it has risen from about 20% in the 1980s to 40% at present.
- The cameras need to be serviced attentively as they continue to be re-used from zone to zone.

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PREPARATION OF THE PERMANENT VOTER REGISTER

MAINLAND UPDATE – NORTHERN ZONE

CONTENTS

	Page
5. THE NORTHERN ZONE	1
6. TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL COMPETENCE	1
• On the Success Side	1
• On the Problem Side	3
7. ACTORS IN CE/VE AND MONITORING	4
• NEC and Government	4
• Political Parties	5
• Religious Institutions	6
• Civil Society	6
8. HANDLING COMPLAINTS	6
• Non-Residents and Non-Citizens	7
• Complaints and Their Solutions	7
9. POLITICS IN THE REGISTRATION EXERCISE	9
• Campaigns at Registration Centres	9
• Double Registration: Politics or Ignorance?	10
• Voluntary or Forced Response?	11
• The Gender Dimension of the Exercise	12

5. THE NORTHERN ZONE

The Northern Zone consists of four regions, namely Manyara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga. Manyara Region was recently carved from the old Arusha Region. Registration started on 19th February and ended on 11th March 2005. Sampled districts and constituencies for TEMCO observation are summarised in Box 1 below.

Box 1: Districts and Constituencies sampled for TEMCO observation, February-March 2005		
Region	District	Constituency
1. Manyara	1. Babati 2. Hanang	1. Babati Urban 2. Babati Rural 3. Hanang
2. Arusha	1. Arusha Municipality 2. Arumeru 3. Monduli	1. Arusha Urban 2. Arumeru East 3. Arumeru West 4. Monduli 5. Longido
3. Kilimanjaro	1. Moshi Municipality 2. Moshi District Council 3. Same	1. Moshi Urban 2. Moshi Rural 3. Vunjo 4. Same East 5. Same West
4. Tanga	1. Tanga Municipality 2. Korogwe 3. Handeni	1. Tanga Urban 2. Korogwe Urban 3. Korogwe Rural 4. Handeni 5. Kilindi

6. TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL COMPETENCE

Technical and managerial competence can be shown by proxy indicators on both the success side and the problem side. All the evidence presented here is based on field reports by TEMCO Monitors.

On the Success Side

On the success side we answer two questions:

- Were targets achieved?
- In general, how effective were the AROs and COs in discharging their tasks?

Registration targets were achieved to a satisfactory level (over 90%) in all the four regions. Box 2 gives a constituency-by-constituency breakdown for the Arusha region. This region records a 100% (plus) due to inaccurate estimation of eligible voters in different places.

Box 2: Summary of Voter Registration in Arusha Region			
Constituency	Target	Actual Reg.	Percent
1. Arusha Municipality	163,131	174,185	106.7%
2. Arumeru East	111,582	104,374	93.5%
3. Arumeru West	146,036	136,405	93.4%
4. Karatu	87,726	89,599	102.1%
5. Monduli	53,913	59,181	96.8%
6. Longido	30,910	37,399	121.0%
7. Ngorongoro	57,454	63,252	108.4%
TOTAL	650,755	656,398	100.9%
Source: Regional Election Coordinator, Arusha			

Although many Assistant Registration Officers (AROs) and camera operators (COs) made many mistakes during the first week, most of them were quick to learn from their mistakes and to make improvements. The TEMCO district monitor in Moshi reports on the on-the-job learning capacity of the AROs and COs:

“In all the monitored centres, AROs and COs were very flexible and creative in solving problems and correcting their own mistakes such as wrong placing of the thumb printing. Ward AROs (WEOs), on the other hand, were very active in passing through their respective wards, supervising and monitoring the exercise, distributing registration materials, identifying small mistakes for correction and providing on-the-spot guidance to the AROs at the registration centres”.

This success side is countered by some technical and managerial problems which the AROs and COs encountered.

On the Problem Side

On the problem side we answer two questions:

- How efficiently were the election materials distributed?
- How well were the materials used?

Taking the zone as a whole, and considering the many logistical problems in rural Tanzania, the distribution of registration materials can be rated as quite adequate. Indeed, achievement of registration targets is itself a result of the efforts of NEC and government personnel to anticipate and deal with bottlenecks as they arose.

However, under normal circumstances, one should not expect shortages during the first week. This happened in a number of places. As intimated in Issue No. 4 of this Newsletter, two reasons may be responsible for this. First, the formula used to update the 2002 census figures is probably incapable of taking full account of population movements in different areas. This leads to oversupply or undersupply of registration materials. The

second reason may be just a result of careless packaging of the materials, leading to oversupply of certain things and undersupply of others. This is plausible because in many cases it has been possible to obtain missing materials from neighbouring villages.

Among the items reported missing in different areas are: photofixes, lamination pouches, registration forms (F1), films, envelopes (Nos. 8 and 9), rubber, stickers, glue, etc. These shortages impaired efficiency of the AROs and COs. Some centres had to close for a day while awaiting supplies – for example, Samanga village office centre in Vunjo constituency and Kariwa Primary School centre in Moshi Rural Constituency.

In Korogwe the shortages caused stoppages at several centres observed by TEMCO – for example, no one was registered at Gereza Shule ya Msingi centre on 02/03/2005 and at Mpiani centre on 01/03/2005. The Moshi district monitor reported a “hierarchy” of complaints about undersupply of materials: AROs/COs to the Ward Executive Officers (WEO); WEO to the District Executive Officer (DED); and DED to the Regional Election Coordinator (REC) who could contact NEC headquarters in Dar es Salaam if there was need.

In general, registration materials were adequately looked after and put into good use by the AROs and COs. However, there were a few disturbing cases of “destruction of materials” due to either wrong instructions by AROs, camera defaults or other technical problems. For example, by 07/03/2005 18 registration forms (F1) had been destroyed at Samanga Village Office Centre (Moshi Rural) due to wrong placing of the thumb print; and by 10/03/2005 about 54 forms and 160 photos had been destroyed at Mawella Secondary School Centre (Moshi Rural) for the same reason. Similarly, 255 photos were destroyed at Lyasoboro Primary School Centre. In such cases, affected voters had to be found for re-registration, but some of them either were not found or would not want to repeat the exercise.

7. ACTORS IN CE/VE AND MONITORING

It is clear that the actors who are now prominent in civic/voter education, in monitoring and administration of the exercise, and in the “politics” of the exercise will be equally active in the forthcoming general elections. This includes four categories of actors:

- NEC and Government
- Political Parties
- Religious Institutions
- Civil Society

How did these actors participate in the Northern Zone?

NEC and Government

All field reports comment on the close cooperation between NEC personnel and government personnel and institutions at regional, district, ward and village levels. The entire government machinery has made this exercise priority number one. However, the significant point is that this NEC-government cooperation has so far not been judged by stakeholders to be “partial” or “partisan” as in the case of the past general elections. If this trend continues in the remaining electoral stages (nomination of candidates, campaigns, voting, vote counting and declaration of results), the forthcoming general elections may stand a good chance of being declared free and fair at least on the Mainland.

Political Parties

Participation of this category of actor is a bit worrying in view of the repeated observation of a big and growing “inbalance” between the ruling CCM and opposition parties. All reports lament this position. We quote two reports here for illustrative purposes.

On CCM, the Moshi TEMCO monitor writes:

“... the ruling party, CCM, demonstrated the greatest involvement and dominance in the provision of voter education and awareness creation for the registration exercise through government officials, and more specifically the village chairperson and ten cell leaders. It is the only party that managed to place party agents in all registration centres to monitor the registration exercise”.

On opposition parties, on the other hand, he writes:

“However, there was very little involvement of opposition parties in the district despite the reasonable presence of a number of opposition parties in the area, including CHADEMA, Demokarsia Makini, TLP, NCCR-M, DP and UDP. TLP and CHADEMA are the only opposition parties which had shown great involvement in the awareness campaign”.

The TEMCO regional coordinator for Arusha makes the same point about the relative weakness of the opposition parties:

“CCM participated effectively in monitoring the registration exercise in all centres in the Municipality. However, the opposition parties (which number about 15) had no representatives at the registration centres except at Daraja Mbili ward who was checking all the 12 registration centres”.

This trend does not augur well for the forth-coming elections. There exists the potential for conflict born of envy.

Religious Institutions

All reports comment on the positive contributions of religious institutions, both mosques and churches. The Roman Catholic (RC) church in Moshi is but one illustrative example. A pastoral letter from the RC church Archbishop in Moshi was read in all RC churches. Describing non-registration by adherents as a social irresponsibility bordering on sin, the letter is said to have been instrumental in increasing turn-up for registration from the second week onwards.

Religious leaders in Tanzania have strong influence on the behaviour of their adherents. Moreover, most religious leaders are still committed to national unity (as priority number one) despite the recent rise of fundamentalist sects in both Islam and Christianity. We should continue to put this religious influence or power into good use.

Civil Society

Role of secular CSOs in the areas observed by TEMCO was very limited. A report from Hanang reads: “The role of CSOs is very insignificant in the district”. The other reports don’t even mention CSOs as actors in CE/VE work for the PVR exercise.

The standard explanation has been that CSOs did not get money (from donors) to specifically handle this task. Following trends in previous elections, CSOs will come to life during the remaining stages if a proposed Basket funding takes effect. It is, however, regrettable that this critical stage has been skipped by prominent CE/VE CSOs.

8. HANDLING COMPLAINTS

This section addresses two problem areas:

- Non-residents and non-citizens
- Complaints and their solutions

Non-Residents and Non-Citizens

Non-residents and non-citizens were in general handled with civility. Non-residents were simply told to go to register in their streets, hamlets, neighbourhoods or wards of residence for easy identification and voting. This did not raise any hussles.

Three of the regions (Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga) are border regions and therefore cases of non-citizens seeking registration were expected. TEMCO monitors tracked four. The first case took place at Longuo “A” Centre (Moshi Rural) on 09/03/2005 when three women wanted to be registered claiming that they were married to Tanzanians. Having been discovered that they were Kenyans originating from Taveta, their application was rejected. They left quietly.

The second case was in Handeni district where one person (an Arab) was refused registration on the ground of being non-citizen. He left undisturbed. The third case took place at Tanga Technical Secondary School centre in the Municipality where a women was discovered to have dual citizenship-Kenyan and Tanzanian. She was refused registration and advised to renounce either of the citizenships if she is to be able to vote in East Africa. The fourth case took place at Chuo cha Afya in Tanga Municipality where a Mozambican wanted to register and was gently refused.

CCM agents, who were found in most centres, were very helpful in identifying non-residents, non-citizens and minors. An Arusha regional report suggests that in some cases CCM agents “overpowered” AROs in making decisions on such matters.

Complaints and Their Solutions

A brief menu of complaints screened from monitoring reports follows:

- a. **On payments:** During the first week a number of complaints were heard from AROs, COs and party agents regarding delays and insufficiency of their allowances. In Tanga, for example, monitors report that AROs and COs were not paid their first instalment until the tenth day. They also complained

that they spent additional five days (till 16th March) shading the OMR which has not been considered in payments. Similar complaints were heard in Moshi and several other districts.

As we have mentioned, they also complained about delays in supply of registration materials, and, especially when ward executive officers directed them to collect materials from nearby centres at their own cost. Fortunately, these complaints were kept at low key and did not grossly affect the overall registration targets.

- b. **Photos in pairs:** Some people who came to register complained about the necessity to wait because photos have to be taken in pairs. A few refused to wait and left (probably to return later or another day).
- c. **People with disability** complained in areas where distances were big, necessitating long walks. In general, however, disability was given due consideration in the registration exercise. The intensified registration information mounted by NEC, government, political parties and, especially religious institutions reached everybody, including the deaf.
- d. **Centres in unhealthy environments:** In several places AROs and COs (as well as voters) complained about placing registration centres in areas which are environmentally and physically unhealthy or uncomfortable. For example:
 - i. Close to a market stinking of rotten fish, vegetables, etc.
 - ii. In poorly ventilated rooms/halls
 - iii. In places exposed to dusty winds and sunlight (forcing AROs to change positions from one corner to another looking for shade and clean air).
- e. **Disinformation:** A few voters in Same and Moshi complained about disinformation campaigns which were misleading people going to register by telling them that the centre they were going to belonged to a party which is not their own.
- f. **Long distances:** People in some parts of Hanang complained about the long distances they had to traverse to reach a registration centre. In one extreme case, the distance was about 36km. The place did not even have guest houses, and commuter buses were limited.

Appreciating the problem, district registration authorities sent vehicles (lorries) to ferry the people to the registration centres. They also sent motorcycles to move AROs and COs to the place where the centre was situated. This positive response boosted the morale of the voters and the functionaries.

- g. **Photographs:** Barbaig elders in Hanang were not willing to be photographed, arguing that being photographed reduces one's life span. They also maintained a myth that taking photographs and finger prints would expose one to the security organs of the state. They therefore restricted their wives and eligible youths from going out to register. Although the voter education mounted by NEC

and other agencies made some inroads in these beliefs, it is clear that a more sustained civic education is needed in such communities ahead of the elections.

9. POLITICS IN THE REGISTRATION EXERCISE

In this section we shall look at the following four issues briefly:

- a. Campaigns at registration centres
- b. Double registration: Politics or Ignorance?
- c. Voluntary or forced response?
- d. The gender dimension of the exercise

Campaigns at Registration Centres

TEMCO has not come across many cases of campaigns at registration centres. It is however, aware that campaigns can take many ingenious forms. Three cases reported from Hanang are interesting. One makes use of a party uniform; the second a party flag, while the third takes advantage of the occasion when a party or government dignitary goes to register.

In the first case, some twenty members of CCM's women wing (UWT) came out of their meeting close to the Ofisi ya Kata Katesh 'B' registration centre and stood in a queue ready to register themselves while in CCM uniform. The ARO refused to register them. The women insisted that they wanted to take photos in their uniforms. The lady-officer informed the adamant CCM ladies that political campaigns were not allowed at the centre and that they should leave or she would take legal action against them. The women left without filing any complaints.

The second case took place on 06/03/2005 when the Chairman of CUF Youth Wing went to the Ofisi ya Kata Katesh 'A' centre with an intention to register while carrying a big flag of CUF. He was chased by registration officials and left the centre quietly without complaining.

The third case involved a government dignitary. On 04/03/2005 Prime Minister Sumaye went to register at Endasak centre in Babati. CCM organised a youth group which escorted him to the centre singing party praises. The ARO took courage to stop them some twenty metres from the centre. He then asked his "client" (PM) to come and register without CCM followers who were in CCM uniform.

The registration assistants in those three examples should be commended for courageously adhering to the law.

Double Registration: Politics or Ignorance?

Two interesting cases have been reported from Hanang. In one case, a woman of Mogitu named Elizabeth Tluway obtained two IDs (Nos. 13057339 and 130571434), having registered twice at Mogitu Village on 22/2/2005. Influx of people that day may have prevented her being apprehended by the AROs, COs and party agents.

The lady betrayed herself when she went around boasting that she had two IDs. Good Samaritans reported the matter to the CCM agent for the Mogutu centre on 07/03/2005, and after cross-checking it was found to be true.

Having been tipped that she had committed a criminal offence which could land her in jail, the lady went into hiding.

In the second case, a man by the name of Maulid Abdallah got himself registered twice on 21/02/2005, first at Ofisi ya Kata Endasak and then at Endasak Primary School, being issued with two IDs (Nos. 13000806 and 130372334, respectively). The man also went into hiding after learning that he had committed a criminal offence.

Both cases were reported to the police who were able to secure the IDs by invading the culprits' houses where they had been abandoned. It would seem that in both cases the motive was acquisition of two IDs (which are treasured by many people) in blissful ignorance of the laws rather than a political ploy for rigging elections.

Voluntary or Forced Response?

In general, response by the people has been voluntary. Cases of forced registration have been few and isolated. TEMCO observed only three cases, two in Korogwe and one in Kilindi constituency (Handeni District).

In the Korogwe case, leaders of Mabatini Village were unimpressed by the response of the villagers to the registration exercise. They were supposed to register at a centre named Old Korogwe Estate. On 1st March 2005 the registration centre was temporarily moved to the Mabatini Village. The village government convened a meeting and literally "ordered" all who had not registered to do so immediately. The Village Executive Officer (VEO) made a house-to-house follow-up to ensure that all had registered. Then the centre was moved back to its original site.

In the second case, students at the Shemsanga Secondary School (Korogwe) had not registered themselves until the 10th March 2005 – a day before the end of the exercise. All students at the school were "ordered" by their teachers to register on that final day.

Thirdly, in Kilindi constituency (Handeni District) the District Executive Director (who is the district registration officer) "threatened" in an announcement that he would take stringent actions against those who would have failed to register themselves. The threat came during the third (and final) week of the exercise.

These presumably isolated cases of "mild coercion" can be understood and probably appreciated in their own contexts. It would appear that there are some cases in (rural) Tanzania where "a little push" can complement civic education. After all, registering and voting in an election constitute a "civic duty" expected of all citizens.

The Gender Dimension of the Exercise

In the history of political thought and practice, politics has been constructed in masculine terms, with males being constructed as principal actors. In Tanzania, as elsewhere in the world, there have been efforts to challenge the primacy of male power and develop strategies that may transform the oppressive relationship between men and women. Such efforts have included gender balance in scholarship opportunities, creation of special seats for women in local councils, House of Representatives and the Union Parliament, as well as encouraging women to challenge men in constituency-level electoral politics.

Box 3: Registration by Gender in Kilimanjaro				
District	Male	Female	Total	Percent
1. Moshi Urban	40,463	43,010	83,473	98%
2. Same	46,926	51,506	98,432	96%
3. Moshi Rural	92,410	98,917	191,327	92%
4. Hai	65,439	65,157	130,596	96%
5. Rombo	50,137	58,123	108,260	94%
6. Mwanga	22,924	24,502	47,426	92%
TOTAL	318,299	341,215	659,514	94%
Source: Regional Electoral Coordinator's Office, Moshi				

As the ongoing registration figures show, the level of women registration is equal to and, in some cases higher than, that of men (see Box 3, for example). Ironically, however, relatively fewer women than men come out to contest in the constituencies; and the rate of success for those who come forth has been rather low. It is disheartening to see that out of the 20 or so individuals who have declared their intention to contest for the Union presidency (11 of them from CCM), none is a women.

TEMCO is inclined to argue the case for a special post-registration civic education programme for women to ensure that more women contest council, House of Representatives and Parliamentary seats than in previous elections.

Appendix I**LIST OF ALL MONITORS FOR PVR Mainland**

S/No	NAME	ORG.	ADDRESS	PLACEMENT
1.	Mr. Agapiti Meiseyeki	CPT	0744049536	Tabora, Mara
2.	Mr. Anthony Kija	TERO	0741 599959	Mpwapwa
3.	Mr. Baumba Chogero	CGG	0741 533322/ 0748821926	Tarime, Manyara
4.	Mr. Emmanuel Cleophace	REDET	0745854782	Kagera, Tanga, Urban
5.	Mr. George Parapara	CWT	0744 290987	Mwanza
6.	Mr. Gosbert Ndamlani	CGG	0744 820 339	Kigoma, Bukoba
7.	Mr. Illuminatus J. Mkoka	MUVITA	0745 561349	Hanang
8.	Mr. Is-Hak Mahmoud Kheri	UWZ	0747 435241	Same
9.	Mr. Kondokaya Kikwesa	FORDIA	0741 410939	Karagwe
10.	Mr. Koshuma Mtengeti	LHRC	0741 691375	Singida,
11.	Mr. Leons Kimaryo	REDET	0744 285 124	Arusha
12.	Mr. Makame M. Khamis	ZLSC	0747 866955	Bariadi, Kilosa
13.	Mr. Mgeni Haji Nassor	UWZ	0747 452207	Sengerema
14.	Mr. Patrick R. Mutayoba	MCT	0744 294 535	Singida, Shinyanga, Kilimanjaro
15.	Mr. Peter Kairanya	MEC	0741 479942	Handeni
16.	Mr. Peter L. Bandio	FORDIA	0748 623697	Kasulu
17.	Mr. Pius Libaba	REDET	0748 435471 (Misugusugu, Box 3 Mlandizi, Kibaha)	Dodoma
18.	Mr. Ramadhani Kingi	REDET	0741 338650	Kigoma
19.	Mr. Renuus Mkinga	CGG	0744 810282	Nzega, Babati
20.	Mr. Shaame Matta Shaame	ANGOZA	0748 917605	Korogwe
21.	Ms. Doris Barnabas	MEC	0741675394/ 0748868783	Monduli
22.	Ms. Elizabeth Stephen	REDET	2410207	Dodoma
23.	Ms. Farida Rubanza	REDET	0748 955808	Arusha
24.	Ms. Indamo W. Mziray	MCT	0741 429 738/ 0744 837366	Bunda
25.	Ms. Janet Kiure	MUVITA	0748 252716	Kahama, Morogoro
26.	Ms. Janeveva Emmanuel	IDS	0741431276	Moshi
27.	Ms. Magdalena Mmbando	CWT	0744 773853	Manyoni
28.	Ms. Nicera Kaijage	REDET	41/48 242073	Urambo
29.	Prof. Yunus Rubanza	Kiswahili	0748931276	Mwanza, Morogoro
30.	Dr. Cosmas Mogella	PS & PA	0744 296704	Coast Region
31.	Dr. L. Ndumbaro	PS & PA	0744261965	Dar es Salaam
32.	Mr. B. Ally	PS & PA	0744 022915	Temeke
33.	Dr. B. Bana	PS & PA	0748225014	Ilala
34.	Mr. Dennis Gatambwa	REDET	0748507850	Kinondoni
35.	Ms. Agness Victor	IDS	0741274798	Rufiji

Appendix II

LIST OF ALL MONITORS FOR PVR Zanzibar

S/No	NAME	ORG.	ADDRESS	PLACEMENT
1.	Mr. Ali Ahmed Uki	ZLSC	0747464794	Mkoani
2.	Mr. Anthony Kija	TERO	0741 599959	Central district
3.	Mr. Emmanuel Cleoplace	REDET	0745854782	Chake Chake, Urban/West
4.	Mr. Fredrick Ngao	REDET	0748 360519	Unguja Urban
5.	Mr. George J. Mkude	TERO	0744 467179	Micheweni, Unguja South Region
6.	Mr. Godwin Mutahangarwa	LHRC	0741 244399	Pemba Zone
7.	Mr. Illuminatus J. Mkoka	MUVITA	0745 561349	Hanang
8.	Mr. Kibore M. Lumona	CGG	0744 689451	Zanzibar North B
9.	Mr. Koshuma Mtengeti	LHRC	0741 691375	Singida, North A
10.	Mr. Patience Sekinabo	FORDIA	0745 463398	Zanzibar North A
11.	Mr. Patrick R. Mutayoba	MCT	0744 294 535	U/West
12.	Mr. Ramadhani Kingi	REDET	0741 338650	Unguja North
13.	Ms. Augenia Mpayo	REDET	0744 628147	South district

Action for Development Forward (AFDF)
Association of Non Governmental Organizations of Zanzibar (ANGOZA)
Campaign for Good Governance (CGG)
Chama cha Walimu Tanzania (CWT)
Christian Professionals of Tanzania (CPT)/ Justice for Peace
Concern for Development Initiatives in Tanzania (ForDIA)
Department of Fine and Performing Arts
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
ENVIROCARE
Institute of Development Studies (IDS)
Kinondoni Youth/ Parents Counselling Trust Fund (KYPC)
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
Media Council of Tanzania (MCT)
Mudugu Women and Community Development (MUDUGU - WACOD)
Multiple Education Centre (MEC)
Muungano wa Vijana Tanzania (MUVITA)
Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET)
Tanzania Emergency Relief Organization (TERO)
Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA)
Tanzania Women Graduates Federation
The East African Uongozi Association (EAFUA - T)
Umoja Wa Walemavu Zanzibar (UWZ)
Zanzibar Legal Services Centre (ZLSC)